Decarbonising the Asian Giants: Comparing Indian and Chinese Models of Climate Action

China and India Matter for Global Decarbonisation

The pathways and technologies that India and China use to produce energy for their future development play a major role in global efforts to mitigate carbon emissions. This blog compares the national climate policies and goals set by the two countries and explores differences in governance and implementation models pursued by the two countries. The blog also seeks to understand how both countries operationalise their climate goals, and processes of policy co-ordination between difference levels of governance. The blog concludes with the policy challenges being faced by both countries, and the potential of learning from each-other for improved policy implementation.

Today, China is the world’s largest emitter, accounting for 31.5% of total emissions, while India is third at 8.1%. While both countries are significant contributors to emissions, a comparison of per capita emissions provides a more differentiated picture. Despite their comparable population, China’s per capita carbon emissions are around 9.24 metric tonnes, four times higher than India’s 2.07 metric tonnes, with the world average sitting in between at 4.69 metric tonnes.

Realising their critical role in combatting climate change, both countries have announced strong national climate goals.

Realising their critical role in combatting climate change, both countries have announced strong national climate goals. China has committed to peaking carbon emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060, while India aims to reach net-zero by 2070, without mentioning a peaking year. These targets not only reflect India and China’s climate ambition but also the scale and complexity of implementation required which is in turn shaped by their governance models.

Decarbonisation Targets in India and China

Table 1 below presents a comparison of India and China’s key climate targets, including their commitments on carbon neutrality, renewable energy capacity, and emissions intensity reductions.

Table 1: Climate Targets of India and China

Source: Author compilation from multiple sources

Graphs 1 and 2 illustrate the installed capacity and share of electricity generation from different energy sources in India and China respectively. These graphs help us understand how the two countries are progressing toward their clean energy targets and transitioning away from fossil fuels.

The first graph shows us the differences in the installed capacity of India and China. China’s significantly larger renewable and overall capacity reflects its ability to deploy large amounts of infrastructure in short spans of time. India’s smaller but growing capacity also highlights progress in solar and wind capacity, albeit at a lower scale. We can see that by 2024, China had already exceeded its 2030 targets for wind and solar.  In contrast, India’s annual run rate for adding wind and solar places it behind schedule for its 2030 targets.

Graph 1: Total Installed Capacity (in GW) in India and China in 2024

The second graph shows us that both countries have similar shares of solar (~6 percent) and natural gas (~3 percent). Hydropower (~13%) and wind (~9%) play greater role in China’s energy mix, while India has a higher share of coal (~75%). However, the existing electricity mix[3]  of both countries reveals that their current high dependence on coal makes energy transitions a key determinant to achieving their net-zero policies.

Graph 2: Percentage Share by Source in Electricity Generated in  India and China in 2023

Policy Frameworks in India and China

In this section, we analyse what policy measures and subnational strategies both countries have sought to operationalise and implement their climate policies.

India

The Indian government launched the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008, which includes eight national missions.[4] These missions were designed to guide climate action across the country and are implemented primarily through state governments, allowing for region-specific adaptation and solutions. Based on the national missions, each state develops its own State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC). This reflected India’s bottom-up approach, where the central government provides the framework, and the actual planning and action are led at the state level. For example, in their SAPCC’s Odisha has focused on reducing electricity losses, Sikkim prioritised protecting its Himalayan water sources, and Himachal Pradesh proposed payments for maintaining forest ecosystems. Through these plans, states aim to connect their specific local issues with the national climate agenda.

Although India does not currently have a formal National Adaptation Plan (NAP) under the UNFCCC, different national and sub-national actors have integrated adaptation across several missions and state-level plans . For instance, the Ahmedabad Heat Action Plan focuses on reducing the health impacts of extreme heat through early warning systems and community outreach. The Chennai’s Water Resilience Strategy targets urban flooding and water scarcity through integrated water management. The Mumbai Climate Action Plan outlines sets 24 strategies across six sectors, including energy, mobility, waste, and flood management, to cut emissions and build climate resilience. Importantly, India has announced that it will submit its first official NAP at COP30 in November 2025. This marks a significant step in strengthening national-level coordination on adaptation, especially for vulnerable sectors like agriculture, water, and health.

China

To operationalise its climate policy China has created a ‘1+N’ framework also known as “working guidance” . ‘1’ stands for one big national plan that sets the two main national climate goals – cutting carbon emissions by 2030 and becoming carbon neutral by 2060, while ‘N’ is a series of supporting documents which includes policy measures and action plan for key sectors and industries. While each province is free to create its own climate action plan that reflect its characteristics , it is still bound to follow the national goal. For example, Shanxi focuses on cutting coal use, while Jiangsu works on measuring carbon in products. Jiang Xiaoqian, project manager of the climate and energy programme at WRI China quotes “The central government would dissect the goals and pass them down to provinces. Provinces would dissect the goals again and pass them down to prefectures, which would then do the same”. State owned enterprises along with the provincial governments are also key implementing bodies of China’s climate agenda. This reflects a multi-level implementation model, with strict coordination and accountability mechanisms.

In addition to mitigation plan, China also introduced its National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035, which outlines a long-term plan to strengthen resilience across sectors like agriculture, health, water, and infrastructure. It emphasises early warning systems, regional risk assessments, and the integration of adaptation into local development. Together, these strategies show how China’s climate approach combines centralised planning with localised execution, backed by evaluation and performance metrics.Top of Form

Comparing India and China’s policy frameworks

China’s provinces are not only expected to follow national climate goals but are also required to develop sector-specific action plans tailored to their local economic and environmental characteristics. These provincial plans often include region-specific targets and strategies, making them more detailed and performance driven. China’s climate policy includes both binding targets enforced through cadre performance evaluations and more flexible, aspirational targets.  The binding targets are associated with specific targets and timelines, ,while the aspirational goals are non-binding and envision ambitious scenarios. In contrast, India’s State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCCs) are guided by the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) but remain non-binding in nature. Each Indian state creates its own SAPCC based on local priorities, and while many include adaptation planning, the absence of a single, unified national adaptation strategy like China’s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035 makes coordination more difficult.

An important difference between India and China’s climate policy implementation lies in how progress is tracked and enforced. China has a well-structured evaluation system where provincial and local governments are assessed using a ‘Cadre Performance Matrix’ system. Provincial and local governments are assessed using a form of bureaucratic accountability that links environmental targets with the career progress of local officials. This ensures that provinces are under direct pressure to meet carbon, energy, and pollution targets, making climate goals legally and politically binding. China also uses internal performance standards for state-owned enterprises, and in recent years has introduced renewable energy consumption quotas similar to India’s Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO) system.

In India, an important enforcement tool for promoting renewable energy adoption is the Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO), which legally requires electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs) and large energy consumers to purchase a certain percentage of their electricity from renewable sources. RPO targets are set by the central government and monitored by state electricity regulators. On the other hand, India does not have a unified, nationwide evaluation matrix that monitors the implementation of SAPCCs or holds states accountable for climate performance. As a result, while policies exist, enforcement is weaker, and implementation varies widely across states.

Together, these systems reflect a key contrast, while China enforces climate progress through centralised performance reviews and political accountability mechanisms, India relies more on policy tools like RPOs and state-driven reporting, which are often uneven in practice.  This may be a reflection of the federal political structure in India. India could benefit from developing a structured, transparent monitoring and evaluation framework that strengthens inter-state accountability and suits democratic governance.

Challenges in Implementation

While China has set ambitious climate targets and built massive renewable capacity, it still faces serious structural and regional challenges in implementation. One major issue is energy curtailment when renewable energy is generated but not used due to overcapacity, poor grid integration or lack of transmission infrastructure. Although the West-to-East Corridor Project has improved connectivity, gaps such as poor provincial coordination and transmission bottlenecks persist. This is partly caused by provincial competition, where local governments race to build energy projects to meet targets or attract investment, often without proper coordination. As a result, resource-rich regions in China’s interior, such as Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia, produce surplus energy but lack the infrastructure to transmit it efficiently to demand centres in the east. These regions also tend to be economically less developed, creating a mismatch between energy generation and local development

While renewable energy capacity is expanding rapidly in the western and southern states, India’s coal-rich but underdeveloped areas, particularly in the central and eastern regions lag behind. As India plans its clean energy transition, it must ensure that it doesn’t repeat China’s mistakes in creating transmission bottlenecks. The social and economic consequences of coal phaseout, including job loss and regional disruption, need to be carefully managed through transition policies. By learning from China’s experience, India can aim for more balanced, long-term outcomes while avoiding some of the structural inefficiencies that could potentially hamper China’s progress.

Despite their different political systems, both India and China rely heavily on decentralised planning and implementation to drive their climate actions. Both countries have recognised the importance of involving regional and local governments in climate governance

Conclusion

Despite their different political systems, both India and China rely heavily on decentralised planning and implementation to drive their climate actions. Both countries have recognised the importance of involving regional and local governments in climate governance. China is a bit more top-down model with strong oversight and performance tracking while India has tended to use a more bottom-up approach rooted in state-level flexibility.

As they move forward, strengthening local capacity, improving accountability, and learning from each other’s systems can help both countries turn their climate promises into lasting progress.

Importantly, both nations have set clear climate targets. China aims to peak emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060, while India targets net-zero by 2070 with strong renewable energy goals. Their climate ambitions are bold and necessary, given their global roles in emissions and development. As they move forward, strengthening local capacity, improving accountability, and learning from each other’s systems can help both countries turn their climate promises into lasting progress.

Finally, it is important to note that while both countries have started the journey towards net-zero, Chinese industries have sufficient domestic capacity to supply raw materials and technologies required to undergo their transition. Whereas, India is still at a nascent stage in developing its clean industries, still having an import dependence on China to meet its needs.

The authors would like to thank Rahul Tongia for his valuable comments.