A great shift is underway in how we buy, eat, move, work and sell owing to technological intervention. Tech platforms—whether a Swiggy, Amazon or Uber in India, a Foodpanda in Pakistan or a Pathao in Bangladesh or Nepal—have eased the pressures of modern life. They have freed up our time, provided jobs to grateful millions and delivered guilty pleasures and last-minute necessities to online buyers.

But behind the dazzle of the digital, much is opaque. Gig workers live a precarious life while internet retailers cope with the oppressive rules of global behemoths. Consumers wonder if there are are consequences to instant gratification and the extreme ease of living.

OTP Please delves into the wondrous new world of electronic commerce by connecting diverse stories and perspectives gathered across South Asia, from Peshawar to Patna and Colombo to Kathmandu. It explores the emotional dynamics between the different actors on this stage, the workings of tech companies and the implications for policy. Deeply researched and breezily narrated, it is essential reading to understand this extraordinary digital age that we inhabit.

This book has been published by Penguin Random House India 

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Climate Change and Public Health Governance and Challenges aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the various ways in which climate change and public health are interconnected. It addresses a range of issues, including the effects of climate change on health, the impact of the health sector on climate change, the intersections between health and climate policies, and the geopolitics surrounding these topics. The book explores specific subjects such as air pollution, heat-related health issues, climate finance, and water security, among other relevant topics. One of its goals is to examine different approaches and methodologies for studying the linkages between climate change and health, including evaluating the health impacts of climate change and developing policies for climate and health governance. It presents insights from both global and Indian perspectives, aiming to offer diverse viewpoints and explore effective and inclusive strategies for addressing this significant challenge.

Published by Manipal University Press

About the authors:

Helmut Brand is the Founding Director of the Prasanna School of Public Health (PSPH) at MAHE and holds the position of Jean Monnet Professor of European Public Health. He is also the Head of the Department of International Health at Maastricht University. Brand has served as the president of both the Association of Schools of Public Health in the European Region (ASPHER) and the European Health Forum Gastein (EHFG). Additionally, he acts as an advisor to the European Advisory Committee on Health Research of WHO Europe and to the Expert Panel on “Investing in Health” for the European Commission. His areas of expertise include Public Health Medicine and European Integration in Health.

Neethi V Rao is an adjunct faculty member and a health policy and systems researcher at the Institute of Public Health in Bengaluru. She also serves as a Consultant at the Supporting the Health System Governance and Policy Unit at WHO, where she focuses on developing normative work on participatory governance and policy, with particular emphasis on its application in the Southeast Asia region. Her expertise lies in health system governance and policy, with a specific focus on the Indian health policy ecosystem. She is also engaged in researching the impacts of climate change and environmental governance on public health.

Dhanasree Jayaram is a Co-coordinator at the Centre for Climate Studies at MAHE, Manipal, and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at MAHE, Manipal. She is currently based in Berlin, where she is a Research Fellow at the Centre Marc Bloch (CMB) and a Guest Researcher at Freie Universität Berlin. Additionally, she is a Research Fellow at Earth System Governance and a member of the Climate Security Expert Network and the Planet Politics Institute. Her recent work includes examining the geopolitical and security implications of solar geoengineering for the Global South in 2022, and she managed a project on “Climate Diplomacy” with Adelphi in Berlin from 2015 to 2020.

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The post Climate Change and Public Health Governance and Challenges first appeared on CSEP.

Given the immense global challenges of the 21st century, the case for MDB reform is clear and undisputed. Drastic, speedy, collaborative action is the need of the hour. This essay has outlined a triple mandate and four categories of measures that MDBs must adopt. To ensure accountability, it has also provided a timeline for implementing these different interventions. However, this is just the first step in initiating broader MDB reform; implementing these measures will require conviction and commitment from MDBs and the institutions that support MDB decision making. This represents the start of a multi-year process of making MDBs relevant again for the 21st-century world.

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The post Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks: Towards a Triple Agenda first appeared on CSEP.

STRENGTHENING THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM of the World Trade Organization (WTO) by re establishing a more effective Appellate Body (AB) is a priority for many WTO member countries (including members of the G20). Although the AB was established in 1995 to hear appeals on trade disputes between member countries, it was effectively disbanded following the end of the final member’s term in 2020, and the US has blocked all new appointments since. The inability of a multilaterally accepted AB to hear appeals, however, severely undermines the goal of providing a predictable, multilateral, non-discriminatory, and transparent international trading system. Several G20 member countries have submitted proposals to restructure the AB but none have resulted in sufficient consensus for reform. This essay draws from existing proposals to outline a framework for procedural and substantive reforms to the AB, suited to changing institutional needs and allowing for regulatory flexibilities to address emerging climate and developmental concerns for the G20 to consider.

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Authored by Om Prakash Mathur, Visiting Senior Fellow at CSEP, the book – a collection of papers written by him over several decades, is a repository of insights into how urbanisation has unfolded itself and how perceptions about urbanisation have changed over time from being indifferent, often even negative, to it becoming an integral feature of growth and economic transformation. Using formal datasets comparable over time, the papers in the book look at the impact of globalisation on India’s urban system and explore the linkages between urbanisation and economic growth.

Efficacy of Asian governments’ approaches to countering spatial inequalities that included the establishment of counter-magnets, growth poles and growth centres, and the development of small towns is the theme of one of the papers prepared for the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UN-HABITAT). Decentralisation as encapsulated in the 74th Constitutional Amendment and the finances of India’s municipalities are examined in a paper commissioned by the World Bank. The papers also dig into issues of the urban informal sector and rising urban poverty in world’s mega-cities.

The book will be especially useful for those who are engaged in urban research and urban policy making.

The book is published by Academic Foundation.

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Praises for the book

Om Prakash Mathur is one of India’s leading urban scholars whose policy perspective on urban reforms has influenced policy makers globally. No-where is this more evident than in his urban treatise Changing Paradigms of Urbanisation: India and Beyond. The book offers a historical, analytical, and empirical understanding of the changing paradigms of urbanization globally and in India. At one level, the book reflects Professor Mathur’s scholarly journey of his research and analysis of the complex process of urbanization and economic development. At another level, it is a clarion call to India’s policy makers to rethink the country’s urban paradigm. At stake, Professor Mathur suggests, is federal India’s incredible economic transformation. Om’s book is a must read for scholars, policy makers, and students who recognize that urban India will determine India’s future.

— Junaid K. Ahmad
Vice President, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and former India Country Director of the World Bank.

This legacy collection from the pre-eminent urban economist, Om Prakash Mathur, is a must read for anyone interested in international economic development. His ideas on public policy shifts needed to match India’s urbanization with productive economic growth are based on a lifetime of direct involvement with the major issues and institutions of our time.

— Janice Perlman
Founder and President, The Mega-Cities Project, Inc.

Few countries in the world display more dynamic urbanisation than India. In this book, Prof Om Prakash Mathur presents a selection of papers written over the last five decades, capturing a period of unprecedented global urbanisation. The breadth of subjects covered in this unique compilation is a testament to Prof Mathur’s diverse roles as academic, policy advisor and thought leader in India and beyond. This book is an extraordinary resource for scholars, practitioners and decision makers wanting to understand how the case for cities has been argued over time and how, today, it seems to have won.

— Philipp Rode
Executive Director, LSE Cities, London School of Economics and Political Science

This collection of 20 essays by one of India’s leading urban scholars examines the multi faceted and complex phenomenon of urbanisation in India. Combining economics, political science and public policy, these essays provide a rich set of insights on the challenges of economic development in India in a rapidly urbanising world. The essays also draw from the author’s extensive experience working for the leading development agencies as well as for the Indian government. The book is a must-read for scholars and practitioners alike.

— Kunal Sen
Director, United Nations University
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)

Media

A perspective on Urbanisation in India- Economic and Political Weekly

India’s Urban Imperatives – Business Standard

A New Book Explores Urbanisation in India and Its Different Facets – The Quint

Interview | Navigating India’s Urban Challenges – NDTV

‘Developing just a small part of city as smart doesn’t take us very far’ – The Print

Contrary to Popular Narrative, India not Urbanising Rapidly – Hindustan Times

The post Changing Paradigms of Urbanisation: India and Beyond first appeared on CSEP.

One of the most critical pushes to address the climate crisis is getting public and private finance flowing to climate action, especially in emerging markets and developing economies. This working paper attempts to quantify the scale and possible composition of the international financial assistance required to help developing countries fulfill their climate change mitigation and adaption targets and suggests how this might be agreed upon in international negotiations. First, Ahluwalia and Patel provide a brief historical review of how the commitment to provide financial assistance has evolved since the start of the negotiations in the UNFCCC in 1992. Second, they review estimates emerging from different studies of the additional investment that developing countries will have to make to meet the challenge of containing global warming to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. Third, they recognise that although international financing has a big role to play, it is unrealistic to think that all the additional investment needed must come from international sources. They argue that developing countries should realise that at least half the additional investment will have to come from domestic sources, with the rest coming from international sources both official and private. In this context, they reason that multilateral development banks (MDBs) have a critical role in leveraging private finance to raise the amount of financial flows to the required level. Finally, the authors provide recommendations for developing countries to organize themselves for more realistic financial commitments, and, through the G20 forum, push for an agreement with the G7 on increasing the capital base of the MDBs to enable the banks to lend at the scale needed.

The post Financing Climate Change: Mitigation and Adaptation in Developing Countries first appeared on CSEP.

In this working paper, Ahluwalia and Patel describe how India could make progress towards meeting its climate change mitigation commitments which involve achieving net zero emissions by 2070. This will require action on several fronts, notably: transforming the electricity sector to rely increasingly on renewable energy (RE), electrification of transport, decarbonisation of hard-to-abate industrial sectors like steel and fertiliser using green hydrogen, etc. All this must be accompanied by improvements in energy efficiency which in turn depend upon rational energy pricing and suitable regulation. The shift to RE will present problems of intermittent supply which has to be balanced through grid-scale batteries or pumped-hydro storage. The working paper shows that the government is aware that action will be needed in several areas and some movement in these directions has already begun. However, the pace of progress has to be greatly accelerated. The multiplicity of interventions needed require coordination not only across ministries but also across different levels of government. The transformation will also involve significant additional investment, and this will call for substantial international financial support. Ahluwalia and Patel emphasise that although there has to be a large role for international finance, much of the additional investment would need to come from domestic sources, both public and private. Private investment in the power sector in particular calls for urgent reforms of the distribution sector which is currently financially unviable because of unsustainably low tariffs and persistent nonpayment of electricity dues. The overall picture presented by the authors is that the transition is feasible, but it calls for determined action in many areas, some of which are politically sensitive. As a practical matter, the long term decarbonisation strategy needs to be decomposed into a strategy for the next ten years, with granular detail on what needs to be done in each sector over the ten-year period.

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The post Non-performing Assets of Indian Banking: An Evolutionary Journey first appeared on CSEP.

DOWNLOADS

• Download the Report

While one may think that voters do not focus on health as an issue when making political choices, the findings of the report indicate otherwise. There is a latent public demand for government prioritization of healthcare and some evidence suggests that those who mark improvement in health services are more likely to vote for the party in power than those who see no improvement. Which level of government – whether central or state is involved in achieving the political goals associated with healthcare is a complex policy arena that raises questions about the political incentives of increasing investment in healthcare and the extent to which there is accountability on the issue via the ballot box.

The post Democracy and Health in India| Is Health an Electoral Priority? first appeared on CSEP.

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The post Resetting the Fiscal Architecture: Lessons for India first appeared on CSEP.

This handbook offers a comprehensive overview of the international relations of South Asia.

South Asia as a region is increasingly assuming greater significance in global politics for a host of compelling reasons. This volume offers the most comprehensive collection of perspectives on the international politics of South Asia, and it it covers an extensive range of issues spanning from inter-state wars to migration in the region. Each contribution provides a careful discussion of the four major theoretical approaches to the study of international politics: Realism, Constructivism, Liberalism, and Critical Theory. In turn, the chapters discuss the relevance of each approach to the issue area addressed in the book. The volume offers coverage of the key issues under four thematic sections:

– Theoretical Approaches to the Study of the International Relations of South Asia

– Traditional and Emerging Security Issues in South Asia

– The International Relations of South Asia

– Cross-cutting Regional Issues

Further, every effort has been made in the chapters to discuss the origins, evolution and future direction of each issue.

This book will be of much interest to students of South Asian politics, human security, regional security, and International Relations in general.

Chapter 22 “Reinventing Non-Alignment in South Asia:The Foreign Policies of Nepal and the Maldives” is authored by Nicolas Blarel and Constantino Xavier

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The post Routledge Handbook of the International Relations of South Asia first appeared on CSEP.

About the book

All too often, the focus of conversation in India is on our failure as a socio-economic polity. We despair about our inability to realize our full potential as a country: we find fault with our political system, the leadership, the state of our institutions, the economic model and much else. What we do not do is reflect on the micro successes and the many examples of hugely impactful interventions that have shifted the needle of society in positive directions. We do not ask the questions: what were the ingredients of these successes? Are they scalable? Are there learnings from these that could be applicable elsewhere in India, and might these learnings provide the guts for a new developmental model?

Anchoring Change attempts to answer these and several other such questions, through accounts of organizations from across India, spanning the seventy-five years since independence. The idea is to revisit these examples of civic action and explore their relevance for the future of India.

The book has two objectives: to shift the conversation from failures to successes; and to distill from these successes relevant design principles that might have wide relevance to create an alternative, grassroots-based, sustainable development model.

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Book review: Can NGOs Change the World?

Book review: Jayapadma R. V., Neelima Khetan and Vikram Singh Mehta (Eds.), Anchoring Change: Seventy-Five Years of Grassroots Interventions That Made a Difference, Harper Collins India

Book Review of Anchoring Change by Jandhyala Tilak, Distinguished Professor, Council for Social Development

Sustainability Next: Despair to Hope

Interview with the Editors | The Print: Tracking 75 Years of Social Interventions in India

The Hindu: An excerpt from Anchoring Change: Seventy-Five Years of Grassroots Intervention That Made a Difference

Financial Express: Clocking 75: Books that capture the essence of India’s journey

Down to Earth: Recommended books

Millenium Post: Fresh off the Shelf

Free Press Journal: Flipping Through the Pages of History

Business Standard: Insiders in the development story

Open the Magazine: Towards A More Equal Society

The Print: Jamkhed was a picture of death—until these two doctors showed up

MoneyControl: Book excerpt | How SELCO helped to dispel 3 myths around solar energy use by rural communities

AESA Network: Anchoring Change: Seventy-Five Years of Grassroots Intervention that Made a Difference

Your Story: Empowerment and Transformation: Learnings and Stories from 24 Grassroots Interventions in India

The post Anchoring Change: Seventy-Five Years of Grassroots Interventions That Made a Difference first appeared on CSEP.

The essays in this book look at these and other fundamental issues from several perspectives in today’s complex global economy. They contain invaluable lessons for what needs to be done to sustain the international framework for global trade and investment that has worked so well since the Second World War and the role that needs to be played by official international institutions to maintain multilateral stability and cooperation.

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Praises for the book

The post Asia and the Changing Global Economy: Rebuilding Growth Potential first appeared on CSEP.

Historically in India, gas has not enjoyed the same strategic significance that oil has. That picture is gradually changing. India imports 82 per cent of its oil needs and aims to bring that down to 67 per cent by 2022 by replacing it with local exploration and alternative energy sources. Natural gas is set to play a key role, with ambitious plans to increase its share in the energy mix from 6.5 per cent to 15 per cent.

Increasing natural gas usage can also help India overcome several challenges such as meeting its development objectives, fulfilling mitigation efforts on the climate change front, providing energy security while reducing fiscal imbalance and so on. Needless to say, it will also have a significant bearing on India’s geopolitics.

Edited by Vikram Singh Mehta, an authority in the energy domain, and with essays by a number of global experts, this anthology lays out a comprehensive roadmap for India’s natural gas sector by analysing supply, demand, infrastructure, pricing, regulations, finance, technology, policy and a host of other issues. The Next Stop is an essential overview of the country’s emerging energy sector in the twenty-first century.

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“As India transits from a predominantly fossil fuel-based energy system, to one built on the pillars of decarbonisation and renewables, natural gas could be the ‘bridge fuel’. This book provides a seamless overview of the entire natural gas value chain and offers a policy roadmap to decision makers.’ – Vikram Singh Mehta

“Vikram Singh Mehta and all the contributors have made a seminal intervention in the debate and discourse on the making of India’s policy related to gas,  by  bringing  together  a  veritable  compendium  of  the  who’s  who  of the gas sector, globally and in India. This volume puts together the encyclopaedic anthology of ‘everything you wanted to know about gas but were afraid to ask.” – Vijay Kelkar

Indian Express: India’s road to clean energy goes via natural gas

The Hindu BusinessLine: Book Review | Why gas is not just hot air

Financial Express: For a predominantly clean system, India must move forward incrementally and make natural gas the “next stop” in its energy journey 

Scroll: A new book argues that natural gas is India’s best choice for moving away from coal and fossil fuels 

MoneyControl: The Next Stop | How is natural gas pricing done in India?

MoneyControl: Interview |’India needs one institutional mechanism for bringing all the bodies that impact energy policy within an integrated framework’

Hindustan Times: Interview | Why India needs natural gas for a clean energy future.

Business Standard: Book Review | The great leap to clean energy

Mint: Book Review | Betting on natural gas as a ‘clean’ fossil fuel

DEW Journal: Book Review (Available in print copy)

FOREWORD – Vijay Kelkar

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION

Executive Summary and Policy Road Map – Vikram Singh Mehta

SECTION B: WHY  GAS?

1. The ‘Green Fossil’ – Gurpreet Chugh

SECTION C: GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. The Global Market: An Overview – Jean Baptiste Dubreuil, Akos Losz

3. Liquefied Natural Gas: Pricing And Evolution – Mike Fulwood, Tim Boersma

4. Liquefied Natural Gas Contracts: The Shifting Contours – Mike Fulwood, Tim Boersma

5. Regulatory Liberalization – Akshaya Koshy Mason

6. Technology and Its Impact – Samantha Gross, David Victor

7. Shipping Liquefied Natural Gas – Anita Odedra, Martin J. Houston

8. Liquefied Natural Gas: From the United States to the Indian Market – Martin Houston, Renee Pirrong

9. Australia LNG – Ian Cronshaw

10. Middle East LNG – Talmiz Ahmad

SECTION D: INDIA – THE CURRENT SETTING

DEMAND

10. Power: Laggard Penetration? – Mohit Bhargava, Kishore Kumar Hota

11. Power: Niche potential? – Rahul Tongia

12. City Gas Distribution: Emerging Potential? – Ashu Singhal, Rajeev Mathur

13. Fertilizers: A Regulatory Dilemma? – Ashok Gulati, Pritha Banerjee

14. The Petrochemical and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Sectors – Amit Mehta

15. Transport: A Substitute Fuel? – Gautham Babu Dasari, Sarah Khoo

SUPPLY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

16. Domestic Production – Rajeev Kumar

17. Pipeline Network – Ashu Singhal, Rajeev Mathur

18. LNG Regasification Terminals – Prabhat Singh

COMMERCIAL

19. Pricing: A Complex Evolution – Anupama Sen

20. Taxation – Neetu Vinayek, Santosh Sonar, Hiten Sutar

SECTION E: REGULATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

21. Regulatory Framework – Sudha Mahalingam

22. Clean Fuels: Managing The Transition – Robert van der Geest, Simon Stolp, Frank van Oordt, Michael Stanley

23. Decarbonization: Models For Sharpening the Trajectory – Ajay Mathur, Souvik Bhattacharjya, Karan Mangotra, Nitin Bajpai

The post The Next Stop: Natural Gas and India’s Journey to a Clean Energy Future first appeared on CSEP.

Watch the panel discussion and launch

Read the blog to see detailed answers to the supply, demand, and regulation of coal going forward

No discussion of global climate change can ignore India, and no discussion of India’s energy future can ignore coal, which provides about half of India’s energy. Coal dominates because it is available domestically and cheap (especially without a carbon tax). If the global focus is on the energy transition, how does India ensure a just transition? Managing winners and losers will be the single largest challenge for India’s energy policy.

Across 18 chapters, drawing from leading experts in the field, we examine all aspects of coal’s future in India. We find no easy answers, but attempt to combine the big picture with details, bringing them together to offer a range of policy options. The Table of Contents shows the breadth of topics covered.

Coal is entrenched in a complex ecosystem. In some states, it is amongst the largest contributors to state budgets. The Indian Railways, India’s largest civilian employer, is afloat because it overcharges coal to offset under-recovery from passengers. Coal India Limited, the public sector miner that produces 85% of domestic coal, is the world’s largest coal miner. But despite enormous reserves, India imports about a quarter of consumption.

On the flip side, coal faces inevitable pressure from renewable energy, which is the cheapest option for new builds. Local air pollution is a national crisis, with 7 of the world’s top 10 polluted cities in India. This places further pressure on coal-based power generation. However, there is significant coal-based power capacity already in place, some of which is underutilized or even stranded.

Low per-capita energy consumption means India must still grow its energy supply. Before India can phase out coal, it must first achieve a plateau of coal. How this happens cost-effectively and with least resistance isn’t just a technical or economic question, it depends on the political economy of coal and its alternatives. Some stakeholders want to kill coal. A wiser option may be to first clean it up, instead of wishing it away. India has unprecedently ambitious renewable energy targets for 2030, calling for about a four times growth of today’s installed wind, solar, and hydro total electricity capacity. Even assuming India doesn’t start building any more coal power plants going forward, it still means that in 2030 about half of India’s electricity will come from coal.

Selected findings include:

1. India actually uses a relatively modest amount of coal on a global scale, if we normalize per capita. Tons of coal is a slightly misleading metric since Indian coal is high-ash, which hurts local air pollution but also means a ton of US coal emits a third more CO2 than Indian coal.
2. The present regulation of coal creates winners and losers by not just location but also by ownership (private versus public sector) and type of user (power plants versus other users). The locational aspect of coal is a key part of the puzzle. Coal is very cheap per ton at the mine but has concentrated deposits in east/central India, which means increased environmental burden in those areas. In contrast, renewable energy is concentrated in South and West India, increasing the spread between states using clean energy and coal. This is also one reason the impact of the transition will hit the Indian Railways much sooner than Coal India Limited.
3. While there are enormous negative externalities of coal, there are also substantial societal payouts from coal across the chain. At the mining level, the government enjoys dividend payments from Coal India Limited, and the railways, which dominates transportation of coal, receives an existential level of cross-subsidy from coal. We also cannot ignore the large revenues from taxes, royalties, and mining fees, which are amongst the highest in the world.
4. While India imposes a Rs. 400/tonne (metric ton) cess upon coal, which even applies to imports, this is only about $5.5 per short ton of coal. If one were to convert this to an implicit carbon tax, it is only a little over $3/ton CO2. Imposing a high carbon tax will be difficult, especially given the implications on the price of electricity (the dominant use of coal).
5. Going forward, India’s focus will be on the combination of a controlled transition, increasing domestic supply, growing renewable energy, and cleaning up coal emissions. These are each trillion rupee questions- how to achieve these in coordination instead of conflict remains the task at hand for policy-makers.
6. If there were challenges before COVID-19, fiscal space and political will for systemic change become even more constrained in a post-COVID-19 world. While there is a clamour for a leapfrog or positive disruption towards sustainability in the “new normal”, there are also greater concerns over resiliency, local supply, and simply seeking cost-effective solutions. Either way, coal will remain part of the mix. How much is a question no one can accurately predict even ten years out, forget 20-30 years hence.

“Coal has historically fuelled India’s rise, bringing energy to millions of households and generating useful economic activity. It continues to be the mainstay of India’s energy mix, even as concerns over climate change and air pollution have highlighted the need to pursue a more sustainable path forward. In this context, this book impressively flags the opportunities and challenges that the coal sector will face in the coming years. The breadth of issues is comprehensive and relevant to all those wishing to understand India’s mainstay source of energy.”

-Fatih Birol, Executive Director, International Energy Agency (IEA)

“Coal’s decades-long primacy is ending, because of declining costs of renewables, its own environmental impacts, and logistics constraints. This book brings out the systemic risks that the coal sector faces, as well as the restructuring opportunities over the next quarter of a century. You may or may not agree with all it says, but you will agree that all of it needs to be discussed today; this book is required reading for anyone who follows the Indian energy sector.”

-Ajay Mathur, Director-General, TERI, & Co-Chair, Energy Transitions Commission

Section I: Summary and Key Insights

1. ‘King Coal’ Isn’t Dead, but Future Indian Coal Won’t (And shouldn’t) Look like It Did in the Past

-Rahul Tongia

Section II: Coal Supply in India: From History to Future

2. India’s Coal Industry and CIL in Historical Perspective

-Rohit Chandra

S1. Global Coal: Production, Consumption, and Trade in the Era of Climate Change

-Peter Nicholls and Tarunika Vyas

3. Issues with Existing Coal Market in India: Monopolistic Structure and Implications of the Current Regime

-Partha S. Bhattacharyya

4. Existing and Emerging Challenges of Coal Production: Digging Deep into CIL and SCCL Operations

-Anurag Sehgal

5. Coal Pricing and Allocations in India

-Anurag Sehgal and Rahul Tongia

6. Policy Challenges for India’Fledgling Coking Coal Sector

-Harsh Sachdev and Anurag Sehgal

7. Coal Mining Technology and Practices in India: Challenges and Prospects

-Raman Srikanth

8. Ease of Doing Business in Indian Coal Mining

-Dipesh Dipu

9. Future of Coal Supply in India: It’s not just about Coal India

-Rahul Tongia

Section III: Ecosystem of Coal: Supply Chain, Use and Demand

10. Bottom-up Scenarios of Coal Requirement by 2030

-Mohd. Sahil Ali

11. RE “versus” Coal: A False Framing when both will be Required

-Rahul Tongia

12. Power and Coal Sectors: A Dysfunctional Intertwining

-Daljit Singh

13. Coal Logistics and Supply Chain in India: The Premier Status of Railways and Coal

-Vivek Sahai and Puneet Kamboj

Section IV: Regulation and Societal links of Coal

14. The Social Contract from Coal to Renewables: Can the Win-Win also have Losers?

-Pallavi Roy

15. Environmental Impact of Coal

-Priyavrat Bhati

16. Pricing Carbon Externality: Context, Theory, Evidence and Lessons for India

-Mohd. Sahil Ali and Rahul Tongia

S2. Managing Corporate Climate Risk in a Fluctuating Policy Scenario

-Damandeep Singh, Gargi Sharma, and Divya Varma

17. Technology Solutions to Cleaner Coal and Power

-Anand B. Rao

Section V: Conclusion

18. Putting it all Together- The Path towards Cleaner and Viable Coal

-Rahul Tongia

Addendum

Coal after COVID-19

The post Future of coal in India: Smooth transition or bumpy road ahead? first appeared on CSEP.

[related-posts]However, certain limitations including the danger of overemphasising defence trade and joint production in this partnership in addition to the structural constraint of India remaining “outside of the United States’ Asian alliance structure.”

There are two important avenues of cooperation – first, the utilisation of Japan’s official development assistance to invest in strategic infrastructure and, second, deepening of cooperation between the ground and air forces of the two countries.

This chapter appeared in a book titled “India and Japan: Assessing the Strategic Partnership“, edited by Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, published by Palgrave Pivot. The book is available for order here.

The post A Confluence of Two Strategies: The Japan-India Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific first appeared on CSEP.

US-India Nuclear deal. Even before the tests, the government also appointed the K.C. Pant Committee to recommend a national security management system for India. These steps eventually led to the creation of the National Security Council (NSC), Strategic Policy Group (SPG) and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). In all these activities (from nuclear testing to creating national security structures), Brajesh Mishra, the principal secretary to the Prime Minister, played a key role.1 However the most significant development was the 1999 Kargil War, which was forced on India and revealed many weaknesses. The public outcry at that time led the government to create the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and the subsequent Group of Ministers (GoM) Committee. These led to one of the most significant attempts at restructuring the Indian military.

With the benefit of hindsight, this chapter re-examines the defence reforms that were initiated during the Vajpayee regime. In doing so it focuses on the big ideas, their implementation, sources of resistance and the debates therein. To be clear, this chapter does not simply list out what measures were implemented – as this has been done elsewhere – but re-examines the reform committees based on what we know now. It begins by describing the composition, functioning, recommendations and salient debates of the two reform committees. Then, it analyses the reform measures that were accepted and the ones which weren’t. The next section gives an overall assessment of defence reforms during this period. It concludes with some observations about the contemporary relevance of the debates surrounding defence reforms.

To read more, please click here.

The post Defence Reforms: The Vajpayee years first appeared on CSEP.

Read the full chapter here.

The post Uneasy triangle: India’s evolving relations with the United States and China first appeared on CSEP.

Tensions are rising, owing primarily to China’s growing economic, foreign policy, and strategic interests in the IOR. As Chinese interests expand they are increasingly coming into conflict and inducing anxiety in New Delhi and, to a lesser extent, in Washington, D.C. This chapter analyses contemporary trends in the IOR and their potential implications for the ASEAN countries. Necessarily, it pays more attention to regions closer to Southeast Asia and only briefly covers developments in the Arabian Sea and around the Straits of Hormuz.

For ASEAN countries, the most important players in the IOR will be the United States, China, and India. Other countries do matter, no doubt Japan has significant economic interests and is keen to expand upon its strategic role, while Australia is a resident power. However, both being treaty allies of the United States, they will most likely coordinate their approach with the latter.

Therefore, this chapter examines the dynamics of India-China relations in the Indian Ocean, and then discusses the role of the United States and concludes with the implications of these developments for the ASEAN countries.

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The post Indian Ocean region strategic outlook first appeared on CSEP.

As India emerges in the 21st century, evolving gradually into a middle income country with increasingly global interests, it will find itself adapting to a rapidly evolving international system. India’s resources today are
greater than at any time in its history, and it no longer confronts existential threats. But while the country may now be less vulnerable, it will have to confront different and sometimes unprecedented challenges.
Are India and its leaders up to the task?

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The post Indian Strategy in a Non-Strategic Age first appeared on CSEP.

Despite these developments the understanding of how the Indian public perceives international developments is poor, with few large-scale, face-to-face or telephone surveys conducted outside major metropolitan areas.

Many surveys also display a lack of awareness or opinions about international issues. The latest survey helps to fill the gap in understanding of public Indian attitudes concerning the United States, China, and the international system; India’s role and relations with Pakistan; Indian identity and democracy; and perspectives on trade, investment and immigration.

To read more, please click here

The post India – The Asian Research Network: Survey on America’s role in the Indo-Pacific first appeared on CSEP.

In an era of greater flux and uncertainty, it is nonetheless important for India to identify the key variables triggered by President Trump’s election, and their implications. They relate, essentially, to four broad areas: bilateral relations; the Asian balance of power; terrorism; and global governance.

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The post Making Sense of Uncertain India-US Relations first appeared on CSEP.

The relationship between India and Germany has been described by the two governments as a ‘strategic partnership’ since 2001. Indeed, just as Germany’s leaders have started to turn their attention to India, successive Indian leaders have recognised that Germany can play a role in transforming India in a manner in which few other countries are capable.[5] But is the relationship, as yet, truly strategic in nature? That would require close consultations on issues that define both countries’ national interests, as well as broad-ranging cooperation and coordination on security, commercial, and developmental issues. Despite enhanced diplomatic contacts, economic relations, and socio-cultural ties, the relationship arguably does not yet qualify as such. What, then, can be done to realise strategic convergence between the two? Answering that question requires assessing bilateral relations to date, analysing some of the difficulties in forging closer strategic ties, identifying areas of convergence, and considering possible ways to forge a strategic relationship in the truest sense of the term.

[1] International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016.

[2] See, for example, C. Raja Mohan, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015); Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones, eds., Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

[3] Richard Anderson, “German Economic Strength: The Secrets of Success,” BBC News, August 16, 2012; Mehreen Khan, “German Trade Surplus Swells to Fresh Record,” The Financial Times, May 10, 2016.

[4] Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, “Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?” International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 9-32; Josef Janning, “Germany – Europe’s Lonely Leader,”  European Council on Foreign Relations, January 7, 2016.

[5] Ashwini Phadnis, “Be Part of India Story: Manmohan Singh Tells Germany,” The Hindu, April 12, 2013; “Germany Pledges Billions for India’s Growth: 5 Takeaways from Merkel-Modi Meet,” Economic Times, October 5, 2015.

This essay first appeared in the book, “Opportunity Beckons: Adding Momentum to the Indo-German Partnership” in January 2017. Like other products of the Brookings Institution India Center, this essay is intended to contribute to discussion and stimulate debate on important issues. The views are of the author(s). Brookings India does not have any institutional views.

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For generations, that single story for Africa had been one of despair, famously headlined as the “Hopeless Continent” by The Economist mag­azine only 15 years ago. Of course, vestiges of the old story elements are still around; the re­cent horrors of the Ebola epidemic, twin cam­paigns of terror of Boko Haram on one side of the continent to AI-Shabaab on the other and persistence  of civil unrest from Burkina Faso to the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the newer single story about Af­rica is that of “rising Africa.” It is time to get beyond  this new  single story as well.  Even Barack Obama – the first Kenyan-American president and the face of the unforgettable “Hope” poster – began his last tour of Africa with frequent references to the “rising Afri­ca” theme. It was only towards the end of his tour that he acknowledged the many nuances of the region: from calling out the evils of tyr­anny based on gender or sexual orientation to the corrosive effects of “presidents for life”. If there is a lesson to be learned from his jour­ney, it is that we must all show the courage and wisdom to tackle many stories and many un­ comfortable truths, along with a celebration of Africa’s true potential.

India’s political and business leaders can, in parallel, take a page from Obama’s travelogue and journey away from the single story. Consider three ways in which their stories would multiply:

There is no single Africa

Africans are far from being a single people . While technically comprising 54 or 55 coun­tries, the continent’s political boundaries are a relatively recent colonial legacy; there are potentially even more “nations” within Afri­ca. Even among the official  countries, there is unevenness and many contradictions. Be­tween the two biggest countries – Nigeria and South Africa – that account for 63 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s total GDP, future pros­pects vary considerably. Nigeria is expected to grow over 5 percent, while the South African economy is expected to grow at a much lower 1.6 percent. The latter, however, is a more di­versified economy, while the former is vulner­able to a collapse in oil prices – and yet has the greater entrepreneurial zeal and energy. Gha­na, and Zambia are examples of countries that have suffered from large macroeconomic im­balances and resulting inflationary pressures. Others, such as Kenya, are tourist-reliant, and the recent bad news from the continent regarding  Ebola or  –  much  more justifiably — terrorism has served to scare off travelers. Rwanda and Botswana, often held up as mod­els, represent just over 14 million people in a continent  of over a billion people.

At the same time, the effects of shared histo­ries often engender a kinship that cuts across the continent. In certain contexts, sub-region­al affiliations, such as ECOWAS or SADC, are even tighter. On the other hand, when a team from an African country competes in the FlFA World Cup or an African wins the Nobel Prize, the continent rejoices. In other words, even a story along the lines of Africa as a collection of disparate peoples or nations risks missing the point.

There is no single measure of Africa as a market

Much of the enthusiasm as far as business in Africa is concerned has been based on a nar­rative of a growing middle class. Media reports and company presentations have repeated statistics that paint an upbeat picture; how often have we seen McKinsey’s “Lions on the Move” estimates of Africa’s consumer spend­ing to grow from $860 billion in 2008 to$1-4 trillion in 2020, or the African Development Bank’s sizing of the African middle class at 330 million people in 2 0 11, growing to 500 million by 2030 or the IMF/ The Economist, forecast that seven out of the 10 fastest-growing econ­omies would be African?

A very different picture emerges from an anal­ysis done by Standard Bank that sizes the mid­ dle class across t he  eleven  countries representing half of sub-Saharan Africa’s total GDP at only 22  million people by 2030.

Unfortunately, the statistics – optimistic or sobering — themselves are hard to trust. Ac­cording to the 2014 Africa Survey, released by Good Governance Africa, 17 African countries have not conducted a census in the past de­ cade and s have not conducted a census in over 20 years. Nigeria ‘s GDP in 2012 was estimated to be $ 26 8 .7 billion. In 2013 it almost doubled after the government “rebased” its estimates after a lapse of 24 years. According to Morten Jerven, author  of  Poor  Numbers, the statistical capacities of sub-Saharan Afri­can economies have fallen into disarray and simply cannot be trusted. Far from there being more than a single story, it is likely that we may even know how many stories there really are for sizing-up the true African market oppor­tunity.

There is no single playbook for Africa

For businesses, there are several implications for how to evaluate the African opportunity and how to approach the market.

First and foremost, it is necessary that executives and country managers get comfortable with multiple stories and prepare to process them  simultaneously.

Second, it is essential for companies to pre­pare to step out of their comfort zones. Many will have to invest in parts of the market value chain that may be far from the company’s zone of competence. Just as Coca Cola, Diageo and SABMiller invest in African smallholder  fruit and barley farmers to enhance their produc­tivity, to make their own supply chains more reliable,  Indian  companies   –   such  as  Maru­ti Suzuki or Larsen  & Toubro,  among scores of others,  including  many  small  and  medi­um businesses — that seek to do business in Africa must find ways to invest in the supply chains and distribution  and service networks.

Third, no player can take on the many, known and unknown, gaps in the wider African busi­ness context on its own. Developing the con­text, growing the market and growing with it will require a multiplicity of partnerships, with home-grown companies, smaller ventures, NGOs and even governments. The seed-to­ shelf agri-business company, Olam, for exam­ple, has a broad portfolio of collaborations in Africa with companies, NGOs with specific technical capabilities, agricultural associations and governments. This creates a mechanism to not only share risk, but to create leverage and have a better grasp of the gaps that need to be closed and on-the-ground specialized capabilities that can help close them.

Finally, there is no single winning formula for a market such as Africa’s. A company, such as Nestle, did many of the right things investing in “best practice” sustainable and inclusive busi­ness models recommended for such nascent markets. The benefits of its scale and global resources cannot be under-estimated; in 2012, over 133,000 people in the Africa/Middle East region earned their living from Nestle – of whom only 26,000 were employees. Simulta­neously, as Nestle struggled to find the sweet spot among African consumers, others, par­ticularly home-grown companies, did better at a more local level at a smaller scale. Moreover, it could be argued that the true untapped po­tential of Africa may be with its youth; more than half of all Africans are now younger than 25. With few opportunities in the formal sector and no safety net many young people work in the informal sector or in small family business­es. The ubiquity of mobile phones is creating clusters of digitally enabled entrepreneurship in some regions, particularly in Kenya. Com­bined with increasing urbanization, there are chances of an African entrepreneurship boom. The entrepreneurial ecosystem could evolve as a powerful partner – as supplier or customer – in growth. It may even become the main driver.

It is troubling to read about Africa in overly simple terms that veer from the irrationally exuberant to politically correct to post-colonial patronizing. Even President Obama, whose own book “Dreams From My Father” on his links  to  Africa, sub-headed:  A  Sto­ry of Race  and  Inheritance,  realized  that by the end of his trip the inheritance from Africa has more than one story. It would be wise for business leaders from India, the U.S. and elsewhere, who have Africa on their radar, to do the same.

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There are three elements to India’s trade re­lations with Africa – increasing the volume of imports and exports between the two countries; government support to the private sec­tor; and the diverse nature of India’s economic engagements, both government and private, with Africa.

Bilateral trade jumped from $5.3 billion in 2001 to $12 billion in 2005 to $70 billion in 2013, which is greater than India’s bilateral trade with the U.S. African exports to India have been growing annually at 32.2% while Indian exports to Africa grew annually at 23.6%. By 2015 it was expected that bilateral trade would increase to $90 billion. According to a report released by the Confederation for Indian Industry and the World  Trade Organisation  in 2013,  if the annualised growth rates between 2001 and 2011 continued then bilateral trade was forecasted to reach $176 billion by 2015 (Figure 1). During the sidelines of the World Economic Forum last year held in New Delhi, African leaders and Indian industrialists announced their joint visions to achieve US$500 billion in trade be­tween Africa and India by 2020 – this is almost five times more than what was projected for 2015.

Much of this increase in trade can be attribut­ed to the steps taken by the Indian government over the years, as well as the initiatives of the private sector in establishing their pres­ence in African countries. There have been nine India-Africa Conclaves organised by Cl I since the first Conclave held in New Delhi in 2005 and the participants as well as project opportunities have grown considerably. At the second India-Africa Forum Summit in 2011, India stated it would extend LOCs (Lines of Credits) worth $5-4 billion until 2014 to support the developmental requirements of its African partners. The triennial Summits, the first of which was in 2008, recognize the growing importance of India-Africa ties and bring together the highest leadership from India and African countries for a structured political and economic interaction. In 2008, India made the announcement of granting duty-free tar­iff preference to Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

The ‘India-Africa Trade Ministers  Dialogue’ is an annual event, since the first one held on May 2011 on the occasion of the 2nd Africa-In­idia Forum Summit held at Head of State level. The ministerial dialogue discusses trade-re­lated bilateral issues and assesses the prog­ress of development co-operation set forward in Africa-India Forum Summits. Launched in 2002, the Focus Africa Programme initially focused on sub-Saharan Africa with empha­sis on seven major trading partners in the re­gion: Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya and Ghana. Together these countries accounted for 69 per cent of India’s trade in sub-Saharan Africa. The programme broadened in 2003 to add 17 more countries, including those in North Africa.

Imports and Exports

African exports to India are growing at a rate of 32 per cent annually, with Indian exports to Af­ rica at a rate of 23 per cent. The top six African exporters to India are Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco and ac­ count for 89 per cent of total African exports by value to India, mainly due to exports of oil, gas, ores and gold. Trade is significantly more diversified across African countries at the product level and all exports from India seem to have some degree of technological input.

India currently faces an energy deficit and coupled with potential supply insecurity from other regions, Africa’s role as a supplier of minerals and fuels may intensify in the short run. Africa now supplies around a fifth of India’s total crude oil imports, having risen from nearly zero in 2005. In terms of product specialization, crude oil and gas account for over two-thirds of exports to India while gold and other precious metals account for 16 per cent. The top six products are crude oil (60%), gold (15%), phosphoric acid (3.8%), liquefied nat­ural gas (2.7%) and shelled  cashew (2.6%) – which account for over 87 per cent of total African exports to India (CII/WTO 2013).

African nations have also benefitted from In­dia’s Duty Free Tariff Preference (DFTP-LDC) scheme for least developed countries (LDCs) – this scheme was implemented in 2008 over a period of five Under the scheme, prior to its revision in August 2014, LDCs were of­ fered duty-free access on 85 per cent of Indi­ an tariff lines; this was extended to 98 per cent following the revision.

Challenges for India’s trade relationship with Africa

The major challenges faced by exporters and importers from India and Africa are primarily: transport and logistics costs; poor business environment (lack of ease of doing business); corrupt practices; and access to trade finance.

Transport and logistics costs are considered to be of greater importance to Indian exports to Africa. Most Indian exporters, due to high shipping costs and insurance costs prefer to sell their goods on a ‘free on-board’ basis in­stead of ‘on-delivery’ (CII/WTO 2013). In this case, the risk of loss transfers on to the buyer – Indian exporters are risk averse due to the high transaction costs associated with export­ing to Africa. Indian exporters also cite poor business environment and lack of access to buyers as another major impediment in trade, especially in exporting services to African Firms find it difficult to acquire the necessary visas and permits required to set up operations in Africa. This is particularly important for information technology firms who are looking to partner with and expand operations in the African continent.

Investment opportunities and challenges

India’s Investments in Africa

Africa today is seen as the one of the largest untapped potential destinations for invest­ments due to its rich natural resources. The continent is the third-fastest growing eco­nomic region in the world with a rate of urban­ization higher than that of India. In this regard, Indian investments in the  region  have seen an upward trend in recent years; investments have grown substantially across the African continent and sectors. Today, Indian multina­tional enterprises (MNEs) present in Africa range from energy to mining to telecommuni­cations to IT-enabled services.

From the Indian perspective the key sectors are agriculture, healthcare and pharmaceuti­cals, textiles, automobiles, banking and finan­cial services, information technology, energy and infrastructure. India today is the fifth larg­est investor in Africa. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Indian investment in Africa, in less than a de­ cade, rose from US$9.2 billion to US$14.1 bil­lion in 2011, which accounts for 22.5 per cent of Indian outward foreign direct investment flows.

Indian firms in Africa sometimes acquire established businesses and are less vertically integrated – they procure supplies locally or from international markets and engage in sales to private African entities. India’s growing en­ergy needs have pushed it towards energy co­operation with African countries as a source of raw materials and energy sources. Indian na­tional oil companies such as the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (ONGC) have invested equity assets in Sudan, Ivory Coast, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Area, and Gabon. Private sector companies such as Reliance have also invested in equity oil in Su­dan, while Essar has procured exploration and production blocks in Madagascar and Nigeria.

In 2009, India completed a multi-million dollar project to lay a pipeline from Khartoum to Port Sudan in the Red Sea. In 2007 and 2009, the Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas and chambers of commerce joined to organize the India-Africa Hydrocarbons Conferences to boost India’s investment in Africa’s energy sector. During the 2009 India-Africa Hydro­carbons Conference, India identified five main areas of cooperation with African countries: buying more crude oil from Africa; investing more in upstream opportunities based on bi­lateral basis; exploring opportunities to source more liquefied natural gas Africa, making available India’s  skills; talent  and technology in cost-effective ways  for the benefit  of Africa and supporting community development programmes in Africa so as to ensure inclusive growth.

Apart from hydrocarbons, the metals con­glomerate Vedanta Resources has invested millions in Zambian copper mines; and the Parliament of Liberia ratified a 25-year deal al­lowing ArcelorMittal to launch a billion-dollar iron ore mining project. Tata Steel invested in a ferro-chrome project in Richards Bay, South Africa. In  2007, the Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative signed a MOU with the Senega­lese government to revive a phosphoric acid plant. The table below shows select Indian in­vestments to Africa in recent years. The Tata Group have had a presence in Africa since the 1970s in the transport, information technology, hotels, mining and telecom sectors. Indi­an MNEs have also ventured into Greenfield and Brownfield investments, spanning tele­communications, energy, computer services, power and the automobiles sectors. Indian investments  stock in Africa in 2008-09 stood at above $9.2 billion, while IMF estimates that total investments at the end of 2011 in Africa were $14.1 billion.

Africa’s investments in India

Mauritius is the largest investor in India with total FDI inflows of $64.17 billion. Mauritius accounts for 40 per cent approximately of to­tal FDI inflows India, reflective of the tax treaty between the two countries. In terms of direct bliateral flows, Morocco and South Africa are the next largest investors with investments worth $137 million and $112 million, respective­ly. Investments from South Africa have been growing at a steady pacy with Tiger Brands, Air­ports Company South Africa & Bidvest, SAB Miller, FirstRand Bank, Standard Bank, Old Mutual, Balela Leisure, Anglo-American, Sasol and Nandos Group Holdings having made in­vestments in the Indian market. Morocco has also invested in the manufacture of phosphate in India. ZuariMarocPhorphore holds 74 per cent stake in the earlier state-run Paradeep Phosphate Ltd.

Outward FDI flow from African countries have steadily grown from $1.5 billion in 2000 to $7 billion in 2010 before falling to $3.5 billion in 2011. A substantial portion of the outward FDI is intra-African and emanated from a few countries, including Zambia, Angola, Egypt and South Africa.

The Make-in-India initiative has been re­ceived favourably by African countries as an opportunity to boost investment. Companies can source materials from Africa, Make the products in India and then sell them in Afri­ca. The African market is expected to expand to $1-4 trillion by 2020, up from $860 billion in 2008. This poses great opportunities for both India and Africa to boost trade and invest­ment relations.

The Indian government has taken significant steps in preparing the Indian private sector to look to Africa for investment opportunities and contribute to value addition and economic growth on the continent. India’s broad-based investment approach can help compliment the trade growth between India-Africa, and help expand the range of goods and services traded between the two. In order to further investments and achieve common goals of development, there is a need to remove bot­tlenecks such as protection of investments, access to capital and an improved business environment.

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Historically, India has participated in near­ly all UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Most famously, India helped set the trend in “peace enforcement missions” by deploying a sizeable contingent-around 5,000 troops as­sisted by light bombers, to the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1963. This militarized mission ensured the unity of Congo and resulted in the maximum number of casualties suffered by India in any UN operation. The end  of  the  Cold War  led to a pronounced increase in UN peacekeep­ing operations in Africa. India contributed to these efforts and was an active participant in almost all missions , sending military observers to Namibia (1989- 1991) , Angola (1989-1991), Liberia (1993-1997 and since 2007), Congo (since 1999),  Ethiopia-Eritrea (since 2000), Ivory Coast (since 2004) and, more substan­tially, sending military contingents to Mo­zambique  (1992-1994) , Somalia  (1993-94), Rwanda  (1993-1996),  Angola (1995- 1999), Sierra Leone (1999-2000), Congo (from 2005 onwards) and Sudan and South Sudan (from 2005 onwards). These military  contingents have at times undertaken ‘robust’ operations bordering on peace enforcement type missions, inflicting and suffering casualties in the process. To support these operations India has also deployed attack and support helicopters, which are always in short supply and are crit­ical to overcome the vast distances in Africa. Tellingly, there was considerable international outcry when India announced that it was with­drawing some of its helicopters for supporting internal security missions at home. While the military’s deployment  is  well-known  the  role of police, including women police officers, and civil affairs specialists assisting in tasks like conduct of elections or other capacity build­ing exercises is no less important. According to some experts therefore India’s combined ef­forts constitute the “backbone” of UN peace­keeping and it is presently engaged in 12 of the 15 active peacekeeping missions.

Understandably , Indian diplomats and mili­tary officers play up their contribution to UN peacekeeping. India’s claim to a permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) rests,  among other factors, to its contribution to UNPKO. During  the time that India held the non-permanent seat on the Council from 2011 to 2013, it identified peacekeeping as a key agenda putting forward ideas to enhance its effectiveness. The Indian military has also deeply internalised  the ideal of operating under ‘Blue-Helmet’ taking con­siderable pride in the success of its missions. Shaped by years of experience many in the military find it difficult to envisage operating outside India’s borders without UN sanction.

In recent times however there has been a growing debate about India’s continued role in peacekeeping operations. Many question the benefits accruing to India from its considerable investment of manpower and military resources. Highlighting the “poorly equipped, mandated and governed operations” charac­terising UN peacekeeping, Nitin Pai and Su­shant Singh argue in The Indian Express that continued participation is not commensurate to the results-either through obtaining a seat on the UNSC or in obtaining “great power sta­tus”. Moreover, observing that peacekeeping is mostly carried out by troops from developing countries, they argue that keeping such com­pany means that India “cannot be taken seri­ously as a standalone great power at the UN.” A final source of criticism has been the bad publicity that has been generated by instances of sexual misconduct and corruption allegedly committed by some Indian peacekeepers and allegations that it failed to adequately protect civilians. Not all these criticisms are valid, especially the notion of what defines a ‘great power’ , however they provide an opportunity to debate the future of UN peacekeeping and India’s role in Africa.

Paradoxically aspects of this debate-specifi­cally regarding the efficacy of UN peacekeep­ing-resonate in some African countries. The failures of UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990’s most visibly in Somalia and Rwanda, led to  a reduction in the number of missions and  a loss of confidence. There was a feeling that the UN had abdicated its role and this, ac­cording to Kwesi Aning and Festus K. Aubyn, created “a sense of African solidarity in find­ing African solutions to African  problems.” These sentiments led the African  Union (AU), a fifty-four country group comprising all Afri­can states, except Morocco, to  deploy 64,000 peacekeepers since 2004 in numerous missions on the continent including Central Afri­can Republic, Nigeria, Darfur and Somalia. Its current mission in Somalia, called AMISOM, comprises 22,000 peacekeepers and is en­gaged in intense  combat  with  the  Al  Qae­da linked AI-Shabaab group. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOW­AS), a bloc of fifteen countries, has also un­dertaken peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. Significantly however these missions are funded almost entirely by donors like the UN, EU or the US and only 2.3 percent of the AU peacekeeping budget comes from its member states.

These developments suggest that the future of UN peacekeeping in Africa is at a crossroads. On the one hand are wealthy western countries that fund but do not commit their troops to peacekeeping missions. They are in­creasingly unhappy with the rising costs of UN peacekeeping-it current budget  of $9 billion is the largest ever. In addition they have raised questions on the ability, and commitment, of peacekeepers to saving civilian lives-push­ing forward the idea of robust, peace enforce­ment missions. Troop contributing non-Af­rican countries, mainly from South Asia and South America, among others, however deny this is the case and instead argue that they are not adequately consulted when the missions are being formulated. African countries, which also constitute the bulk manpower, are caught in the middle-financially dependent upon ‘developed countries’ while requiring addi­tional manpower, resources and support from ‘developing countries ‘ to bolster their capabil­ities.

The Third India Africa Forum Summit in Oc­tober 2015 offers an opportunity to deliberate upon some of these issues to further strength­en security cooperation. Towards that end there are three main recommendations flowing from this analysis. First, India and Africa need to embark on a serious discussion on the future of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. This needs to take head on the criticism levelled against it – failure to protect civilians, or allegations of misbehaviour and corruption. Most importantly it should focus on steps to increase the overall effectiveness of peace­ keeping missions and explore opportunities for conflict resolution and termination.

Second, India should consider scaling up its security assistance to African countries. In the previous Africa India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a contribution of $2 million towards AMISOM. This should be increased by a considerable degree, especially since this mission is involved in intense combat opera­tions. In addition, India has deployed military training teams in Botswana, Zambia, Lesotho and Seychelles. Such relationships should be enhanced and offered to other countries who express an interest. India’s help could be cru­cial and cost-effective in imparting specialised skill-set like helicopter flying, casualty evacua­tion, medical training, etc. India can also offer items for defence trade-like radio sets, mili­tary vehicles and other ordnance stores.

Finally, India and Africa should shed their per­ceived reticence to discuss security issues and establish a high level defence dialogue. By all appearances India’s existing defence dia­logues with African countries are on a bilat­eral basis. This is understandable as different African countries have varying perceptions on security. However, lately there has been a gradual turn towards multilateral security en­gagements. As discussed earlier the AU and ECOWAS are slowly emerging as serious ac­tors. Acknowledging this development and in its effort to support these institutions, India should offer to hold a defence dialogue with these organisations. These dialogues could fo­cus on role of regional associations, capacity building and the overall security architecture. In the long run, the historical model of peace­keeping in Africa-funded by the West and manned largely by Asian countries – is unsus­tainable. While the budget for UN peacekeep­ing is currently at a record high, this level of fi­nancial support is not assured. India ‘s efforts in peacekeeping have thus far been remark­able but it  is now perhaps time to transition to an ‘African owned-African led’ solution. Gradually reducing its peacekeeping respon­sibilities therefore may be for the best-and might have the added advantage of eventually enhancing India-Africa relations.

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At the start of the government’s tenure it pursued both the bilateral and regional tracks with equal vigor. The former was evident in the high level visits to Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan within the first 100 days of the government assuming office and signaled a strong push toward reviving bilateral ties with neighboring countries. The latter approach was apparent in the unprecedented invitation to leaders of all South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations to Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in. The fact that the leaders, including Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, accepted the invitation indicates that his SAARC counterparts share Modi’s vision. This largely symbolic curtain raiser set the stage for great expectations of even bolder regional initiatives by the government. Out-of-the-box proposals for a SAARC satellite and a SAARC Centre for Good Governance indicted the government’s intention to play a proactive role in enhancing regionalism (while also countering Chinese inroads in the space arena and advancing New Delhi’s democracy promotion project).

At the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in November 2014, Modi pitched for “reinvigorating” and “revitalising” SAARC. He promised to help his neighbors on issues of trade, transit, visas, investments, education, health, communication and space technologies. Despite Modi’s encouraging gestures the final outcome dashed any hope of reviving regionalism. Of the three connectivity agreements on road, rail and energy on the agenda, only one agreement – on establishing a regional energy grid – was ultimately concluded in a last-minute deal. Other agreements were blocked by Pakistan, stalling the connectivity process, and underlined that mutual distrust between members would continue to stymie regionalism. Had Pakistan’s leadership not clinched the energy deal, the SAARC summit was doomed for complete failure. There were also no major breakthroughs on other important issues, such as fighting terrorism, flow of investments and financial agreements to deepen regional integration; the summit’s ambitious theme of “Deeper Integration for Peace and Security” remained unrealized.

Partly due to the near failure of the SAARC summit and partly on account of the inability to address deep mistrust with some SAARC members Modi appears to have veered toward establishing stronger bilateral relations with other SAARC countries. The need for robust bilateral relations in South Asia is underlined by not only the economic opportunities that these relationships have to offer but also the rising spectre of Chinese influence in the region. Compared to the failed regional experiment at SAARC, Modi has been relatively more successful in pursuing bilateral relationship.

In March 2015, he became the first Indian prime minister to visit Sri Lanka in 28 years and also the first to visit post-war Jaffna, the Tamil stronghold, during his visit. While in Sri Lanka, Modi emphasized a “united” Sri Lanka and inaugurated the reconstructed Northern Province Railway Line, one of the few major Indian infrastructure projects in the country. The election of Maitripala Sirisena as the new President of Sri Lanka and his more positive stance toward India also raised the prospects of improved relations between New Delhi and Colombo.

Similarly, Modi also clinched the boundary agreement with Bangladesh; a dispute that dates back to India’s independence. The Indian parliament’s recent approval of the legislation to finalize the land boundary with Bangladesh follows from the agreement by New Delhi and Dhaka to abide by the decision of an international tribunal on the maritime boundary between the two countries. Modi is also likely to finalize the Teesta water sharing agreement during his upcoming visit to Dhaka in June. While the previous government initiated these efforts, Modi deserves credit for securing support from all parties involved – including the state of West Bengal – and closing the deal.

Modi’s bilateral disaster diplomacy was evident in his quick response to the deadly earthquake that rocked Nepal and killed over 8,000 people in April. As a part of its relief efforts, India sent disaster-response teams, medical aid and food supplies to Nepal within hours of the earthquake and promised to do everything within its capability to help Nepal recover and rebuild. The government’s action have gone a long way in not only shoring up India’s image as a responsible and reliable regional power but might also have countered China’s formidable disaster diplomacy in its backyard.

Despite moderate diplomatic successes with the abovementioned states in the region, the government has had little success with either Pakistan and, surprisingly, even Afghanistan. During Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s first visit to India in April, no bilateral agreements were signed and there was no forward movement on the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement. However, Modi reiterated the Indian government’s commitment and support to Afghanistan’s peace and stability, signaling no major change in the government’s policy towards Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Pakistan remains a glaring challenge of Modi’s “neighbourhood first” policy. While there was cause for celebration when Modi invited Sharif for his inauguration, relations soon deteriorated with India cancelling foreign secretaries’ talks in July and the exchange of fire across the Line of Control. Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s consequent visit to Pakistan in March did pave the way for resumption of dialogue between Islamabad and New Delhi, but no major breakthroughs were announced. Unless the Modi government can achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with Pakistan either bilaterally or regionally (and there is no indication of that possibility so far) the “neighborhood first” policy will remain incomplete.

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The Modi-Obama Summit: A Leadership Moment for India and the United States, a briefing book with memos by Brookings experts in New Delhi and Washington, issued on the eve of the first summit, highlighted some of the challenges and opportunities for both leaders and offered ways to move forward on a number of issues facing both countries.

Both leaders did seize the leadership moment that the first summit provided to give momentum and outline the future contours of the India-U.S. relationship. This was apparent in their joint Washington Post op-ed, “A Renewed U.S.-India Partnership for the 21st Century,” a vision statement and the ambitious joint declaration, which called for consultations on global and regional issues, as well as a bilateral focus on economic growth, energy and climate change, defense and homeland security, and high technology, space and health cooperation. The New Delhi summit – their second in less than six months – is an ideal opportunity to build on that joint vision.

The India-U.S. relationship is evolving against the backdrop of growing global disorder. A recalcitrant Russia, a resurgent China and a fragile and vulnerable Afghanistan pose challenges to both India and the United States. Additionally a series of ‘black swan’ events – from the dramatic and brutal rise of Islamic State, to the precipitous fall in oil prices, and the inability to curtail the Ebola outbreak – revealed how ill prepared nations, including India and the United States, are to deal with them.

With the upheaval wrought by state and non-state actors to its west and inter-state tensions to its east, India sits at the epicenter of the unfolding geopolitical uncertainty; New Delhi might have no choice but to help manage the chaos and restore order regionally and globally for its own interest. There is growing recognition in the Modi government that the United States is probably the best partner to address these challenges and help India’s rise despite the differences that persist between the two countries and the questions about reliability. The Obama administration, on its part, has repeatedly stated that even if India and the United States will not always be on the same page, India’s rise is in U.S. interest not least because a strong, prosperous, inclusive India could help manage global and regional disorder.

Even before the second summit, a spate of high-level visits and consultations on trade disputes, intellectual property rights, defense cooperation, civil nuclear cooperation, clean energy and climate change, and infrastructure investment indicated the serious efforts that have been ongoing to clear the backlog of hurdles and pave the way for enhanced cooperation in the future. However, given the sheer complexity of some of these issues, coupled with the lack of trust between the two bureaucracies and the entrenched interests on both sides, it is unlikely that all of them will be resolved by the summit.

Nonetheless, it would be crucial for President Obama and Prime Minister Modi to ensure that despite this the relationship continues to deepen and widen.

This briefing book analyses some crucial geopolitical and geoeconomic issues that directly affect India and the U.S., as well as their relationship with each other. Additional memos examine the progress made in implementing elements in the joint declaration and focus on a range of issues on which India and the U.S. are or need to be cooperating, including in the foreign, security, economic, energy, urban and social policy realms.

However, a successful summit is only as good as the ability to deliver on the promises made. Here, both Prime Minister Modi and President Obama face challenges in their ability to deliver on potential summit commitments.

The post Introduction: Building Up the India-U.S. Relationship first appeared on CSEP.

1)      Finance: The high cost of capital is just one reason for the relatively high cost of renewable power.  In addition to absolute costs (which are falling), risks of all power projects remain, making the required returns on investment higher than optimal.  Utilities are cash strapped, and broader reforms and improvements in utility operations and finances will go a long way to making the case for renewable power (rather, all power).  By some measures, traditional fossil-fuel power projects have higher risks, since they require fuel linkages, water supply, etc., and are often very large sized.  On the other hand, RE projects might sometimes be given a short-shrift by states, with delayed payments and other operational headaches.

2)      Grid integration for renewables, with dynamics.  While we now have a unified national grid, it wasn’t designed for taking Tamil Nadu wind power to Delhi air conditioners.  (It’s a separate issue that the 5 Regions of India’s grid have limited interconnectivity which must be strengthened and dedicated transmission “green corridors” don’t entirely solve the problem).

1. Coordinated and dynamic planning (and transmission pricing).  For all bulk RE projects, not only must transmission be firmed up in advance, such calculations must be for a dynamic grid, instead of a static/average calculation.  The transmission system today needs upgraded calculations to handle dynamics, and congestion, ideally through a pricing mechanism such as Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP).
2. ToD and dynamic power pricing (bulk procurement, and eventually consumers).  The broader power system needs to move towards Time of Day (ToD) pricing.  While retail (consumer) ToD will take time and requires new meters, the first step should be bulk power procurement ToD by Distribution Utilities, instead of today’s generation contracts which focus on a single dimension of kilowatt-hours through PLF targets.
3. Storage technologies.   In addition to the technology innovations needed to reduce costs, storage technologies need an appropriate regulatory frame to provide value.  In addition to ToD pricing to encourage energy arbitrage (supply: off-peak to peak, demand: peak to off-peak), storage especially helps for short-term fluctuations in supply and demand, through ancillary services.
4. Ancillary Services.  These are systems, which could operate through a market mechanism, but don’t have to, for keeping the grid stable, instead of just valuing kilowatt-hours.  A few of the ancillary services include the ability to ramp-up/ramp-down quickly, frequency regulation, and black-start capability.

3)      Forward-looking yet realistic targets, incentives, and perhaps penalties (for RPO or other non-compliance).  Realistic targets that factor in transmission, grid management, variability, finance, etc. would be much more sustainable than the (almost) cycles of boom-bust that accompany support-driven growth of renewables, which collapse when the rules change.  If there are Renewable Portfolio Obligations, these must be enforced, which would then send stronger pricing signals, either directly or through tradable Renewable Energy Certificates.   If a Regulator wishes to set the price for renewable power, they are might not get it right.  Too low and there would be few suppliers.  Too high and not only would many cry foul, the buyers (utilities) would struggle to pay.  This highlights the challenge of bids and so-called market solutions as being done today.  They may be efficient from a supplier perspective, but this does little towards discovering utility equilibrium willingness-to-pay.  In such cases, an encouraged (if not mandated) target may be required.

Any future policy plans need to also reflect structural issues of ownership and incentives. Unlike solar farms, most wind farms have many small individual owners (e.g., one turbine each), but are operated by a wind promoter.  Thus, policies need clarity between owner and operator, individual turbine or farm.  This also impacts any attempts at “re-powering” wind farms, a key need since older turbines are less powerful and less efficient.  Here, the ability to collate and consider farms as cooperatives may be important since we have can different owners of individual turbines within a wind farm, each with different vintage, efficiency, tariff, etc.^[1]

For solar power, the incentives issues is further complicated for small-scale distributed generators (e.g., roof-top solar), where now end-user’s rational economic comparison becomes between solar generation (which can be cheaper if opportunistic, i.e., without any output back-up or predictability) and retail grid-power, which has cross-subsidy based pricing, and thus higher tariffs for some classes of users, precisely the ones most likely to jump into personal renewable generation.  These aren’t comparable, since the grid is inherently designed for multiple supply options, redundancy, maintenance, etc.

4)      Better accounting and numbers.  The above-mentioned dynamic aspects of operations and payments are just a subset of the improved data required for making renewables more sustainable.

1. Predictions.  While computational improvements (especially so-called “big data”, “Smart Analytics,” etc.) can help, real-time monitoring stations with instantaneous sharing of data will go a long way towards at least knowing about upcoming variability.   This needs coordination, perhaps through the proposed Renewable Energy Monitoring Center(s) (REMCs).  Dynamic and granular (localized) information will help grid operations – an average number isn’t good enough.
2. b.       Environmental impacts, especially on a lifecycle basis. While externalities are a tough challenge to handle, worldwide, even before we consider how to alleviate them (taxes, subsidies for helpful things, regulatory fiat, etc.), we first need to properly measure the externalities and other environmental impacts of energy, both renewable and conventional.  A transparent framework combined with a database would be the direction to move towards.
3. Jobs and employment, both during implementation and ongoing operations.  Given the mix of public and private, large and small, owned and outsourced, etc., there are no good numbers on the manpower implications of green energy.  Such information isn’t just to help choose technologies but also to improve deployments, especially given skilled labour (for not only deployment but operations and maintenance) is a bottleneck for many projects, especially in remote locations.

5)      Innovation.  Renewable energy is inherently about innovation, and R&D can help with not just the efficiency of a solution (the science), but also its costs (the engineering).  India has been riding the wave of global reduction in solar panel costs, but all of its cells are based on imported silicon.  One worry some folks have is to what extent are recent (low) prices the result of a global glut or push for market share?  Even if that is not the case, India should not only start and expand in-country production capabilities, it should innovate for technologies needed for its own conditions, such as low-wind-speed wind turbines, hybrid (grid + home) grid-interactive inverters for solar panels that don’t switch off when the power fails but instead isolate the house and continue supplying power to the home, etc.

Some innovation is missing due to lack of policy clarity or support.  Solar thermal power would benefit from Time of Day (ToD) pricing due to its ability to easily store energy for a few hours.  Even more strikingly, solar thermal plants could be synergized with other fuel inputs for producing predictable if not continuous power (which also lowers the costs).  However, policies in India disallowed innovation for multi-fuel options since the incentives were only for solar power, and there were worries about misuse.  While measurements and cost allocations might not be 100% accurate (and based on assumptions), one could come up with transparent and fair norms for hybrid solar thermal power plants.

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The post Making Renewable Power Sustainable in India: Chapters and Volume Summary first appeared on CSEP.

Foreword

Renewable energy, more specifically, electricity from renewable sources of energy, has traditionally been viewed in a narrow lens of price and market share.  While true that prices are falling and market shares are rising dramatically, a more detailed analysis of the scalability, viability, and growth of renewables must place renewable energy (RE) in the context of the broader electricity grid.   The power sector in India already faces enormous challenges, most notably of limited access (electrification), shortfalls of power (manifested by load-shedding), and precarious finances of the power utilities, with annual losses measured in many tens of thousands of crores per year.

In this backdrop, the government has announced bold targets for RE, most notably solar power, aiming to grow to 100,000 MW by 2022, compared to today’s total utility grid of some 250,000MW.  What will RE do to the power system, not just from the obvious economics perspective, but also from a grid management perspective?  It’s well known that RE is variable – how will the Indian system manage?

More than just a question for utilities, RE is attractive for end-users as well, who can generate their own power (e.g., via roof-top solar photovoltaic, or PV, panels).  But, if those who pay the most for power today are the first ones to leave the traditional grid, what will this do the to the rest of the system?  Hence, transformation is the fundamental question that RE brings – what will RE do to supply-demand balances, and what will be the role of the traditional grid?

With an aim of increasing dialogue towards making renewables sustainable in India, and move the overall power system towards being green, clean, and smart, Brookings India is delighted to bring together experts in this space with academic, non-profit, government, and industry experience, to share short essays on different aspects of sustainable electricity in India, with focused recommendations spanning the short-term (easy) to longer-term (challenging).  Our focus is limited to renewables-based electricity, and not all renewable energy (where biomass and solar thermal have great potential).  Also, as per norms, only mini or micro-hydropower is considered in this framework of renewable energy; bigger hydro plants are considered conventional sources of energy.  As with all publications from Brookings, the views presented are those of the authors, and there is no institutional viewpoint taken.

The Table of Contents shows the wide range of topics covered, from small to large scale RE, the environment, jobs, institutional and financial issues, to R&D.  There are also chapters asking tough questions on grid integration and economics.  A shortcut answer to the over-simplified question of how much RE can the grid handle is that the truth lies somewhere in between extremes.   RE is neither a silver bullet to increased supply, nor is it a burden that will collapse the grid.  The grid can handle more and more renewables, but at a cost.  Even costs themselves are dependent on assumptions, and claims of “grid parity” today must be taken in context (one cannot compare retail prices with bulk procurement prices).  Ultimately, we hope this volume provides reflective analysis combined with focused policy recommendations for this space.

The government has a commitment to renewable energy, and the private sector has also responded well.  Ultimately, we want to accelerate the trajectory of renewables in the most sustainable manner possible, with sustainability defined not just as the environment but also economics and equity.

Book launch by Power Minister Piyush Goyal

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Table of Contents

(Click title to view individual chapter)

• Introduction Rahul Tongia
• Chapter Overviews and Volume Summary Rahul Tongia
• Renewable Energy Basics and Frameworks
• Renewables and the Grid Rahul Tongia
• Institutional and Financial Issues Anish De
• Renewables and Economics Rahul Tongia
• RE Scalability
• Making Grid Scale Renewables Work Sumant Sinha
• Making Small Scale Renewables Work Harish Hande, Surabhi Rajagopal, Vikshut Mundkur
• Future Transformations
• The Electricity Future and Synergy: Efficiency Ashish Khanna & Mudit Narain
• The Electricity Future and Synergy: Storage and Smart Rahul Tongia
• Beyond the Techno-Economics of RE
• Environment Issues and other Externalities Ramprasad Sengupta
• Renewables and Employment Sabina Dewan
• R&D and Innovation for Renewables Gopichand Kattragadda
• Renewables Policy and Broad Recommendations Kirit Parikh

The post Making Renewable Power Sustainable in India first appeared on CSEP.

This chapter discusses renewables integration in the context of the larger electricity system, especially the interconnected grid.  More than just the global challenges of location-specifics (concentration in often remote locations), variability, and economics, the Indian power system is different from that of the west.  Most importantly, the Indian grid peak demand is mostly in the evening, driven by lighting and household plus commercial use, and many renewables have limited if not zero output at this hour.  While storage technologies might help, this is some ways away from commercial viability.  Thus, for every kilowatt of solar capacity added, almost one kilowatt of something that can be despatched (called on demand) must be added.  There is also the challenge of a weaker grid, with no spinning reserves.  To address these, some of the recommendations span proper accounting, improved pricing (that doesn’t treat every kilowatt hour the same, rather adding factors for time of day, location, congestion, etc.), and the creation of ancillary services for the grid.  These are systems if not markets for non-traditional non-kilowatt-hour services such as frequency regulation and voltage support, which make the grid more stable, especially in light of fluctuations in both supply and demand.

[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YfZq-zTLsw&w=560&h=315]

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Click image to download PDF of chapter

This chapter is a part of Brookings India’s edited book, “Blowing Hard or Shining Bright? Making Renewable Power Sustainable in India”  To view the preface and table of contents, click here.

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The post Renewables and the Grid first appeared on CSEP.

This chapter (sidebar) focuses on the economics of renewables, pointing out that more than just typical power plant variables like construction cost, interest rates, plant load factors (aka capacity utilization factors), etc., economic comparisons must factor in network level costs due to the variability of most renewables.  With one set of assumptions, solar power could already be cheaper than imported coal power.  With another set of assumptions, it is 2 to 3 times as expensive over the lifetime from a utility procurement perspective.

To see the model used please click here.
[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BfbAbSteTM&w=560&h=315]

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Click image to download PDF of chapter

This chapter is a part of Brookings India’s edited book, “Blowing Hard or Shining Bright? Making Renewable Power Sustainable in India”  To view the preface and table of contents, click here.

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The post Renewables and Economics first appeared on CSEP.

This chapter explores the future of the grid as a Smart Grid, in particular how it can synergize with renewable power.  This includes new (dynamic) pricing schemes, storage technologies, and dynamic demand management.  Each of these aspects, rather, the entire spectrum of a Smart Grid needs policy support, independent of the links to increased renewable power.  These include new tariff and pricing schemas, support for new technologies, and even a new framework for Smart Grid rollouts across the nation.  One additional area where Smart Grids and renewables intersect is for distributed generation, including microgrids, where now power can flow upwards from the edge, instead of top-down (aka centralized delivery).  This requires legal, regulatory, and safety-engineering standards and policies to materialize and scale.

[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhdMrxMT2f4]

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The region has vast untapped energy resources. These have not been monetized because of lack of cooperation among the members. Estimates vary, but with the second largest inland water resources in the world and a steep, mountainous topography Nepal could generate up to 40,000 MW of hydro electricity. It currently only generates around 650 MW. Bangladesh could be sitting on huge reserves of gas. Here again, the estimates have varied with politicians taking a conservative tack for concern they might be criticized for failure to produce, and technocrats convinced that with the right combination of incentives and technology Bangladesh could export gas.

The idea of cooperation has been mooted in the past and some progress has been made. The SAARC energy center was set up in Islamabad in 2006 to study and identify possible areas of cooperation around trade, technology transfer, data sharing, renewables and demand management. The center has done good analytic work but none of their ideas have acquired physical traction. This is because it does not have the requisite political support. The board of governors of the center consists of mid- to senior level technocrats whose strength lies in the generation of ideas but not on delivery.

This is a lacuna that now needs to be addressed. Lessons should be drawn from two noteworthy examples of regional energy cooperation – the Indo- Bhutan deal to build the Chuka hydro project and the Soviet Union (Russian) – European gas supply deal. Bhutan agreed to allow Indian engineers and Indian finance to build the dam despite sovereign concerns about dependency on a large and more powerful neighbor. Today Chuka meets the bulk of Bhutan ‘s energy requirements and also provides electricity to several contiguous Indian states. The Soviet Union – European Union Gas supply deal survived the vicissitudes of the Cold War and gas flowed into Europe uninterrupted even at its height. There were two reasons for the success of these two projects. First, they created an interlocking, interdependent and mutually value adding relationship. Second, the signatories established fit for purpose mechanisms for delivery supported at the apex level by political leadership. SAARC leaders need to proceed down a similar path.

At the multilateral level SAARC should look to establish a SAARC technology center. This center should be located in Bangladesh or Nepal (so as to avoid charges of India’s dominance) and it should have a diversified board comprising politicians, businessman, technocrats and Non Governmental Organizations. The objective of the Centre should be to do primary research on clean energy and renewables, and through the dissemination of information build public and political support for multilateral partnerships.

At the bilateral level, there are five potentially win-win value adding projects that should be taken up at the summit. One, the establishment of a thermal power plant financed and located in the Thar Desert of India but fuelled by coal mines across the border in Pakistan. By itself, neither activity would pass economic muster. Together both the mining of coal and the generation of electricity could meet the promoters’ threshold criteria of profitability.

Two, the construction of a power plant in India (Punjab) fuelled by gas piped through the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. The electricity generated would be transmitted predominantly to Lahore. Thus were gas supplies choked in Pakistan the consumers in Lahore would bear the brunt.

Three, the supply of petroleum products (petrol, diesel, LPG, kerosene) from the Bhatinda refinery to consumers in Pakistan via a 150 km pipeline built from Jalandhar to the border. Currently Pakistan (Punjab) meets its demand through imports into Karachi and a 1000-plus km petroleum products pipeline from Karachi to Lahore. Sourcing from India would be significantly cheaper. For the Bhatinda refinery the benefit would be access to a larger market and higher capacity utilization and scale economies. A variant, albeit unrelated, idea would be to ship products from the export refineries of Reliance and Essar in Jamnagar to Karachi.

Four, the development of a hydro project similar to Chuka on the Kosi river in Nepal. Dams are controversial but the hydro potential is so huge that the project warrants consideration.

And five, the monetization of Bangladesh gas reserves through the Indian market. There are political blockers but here again the potential gain for both countries is such that the subject should be brought back onto the agenda.

The crisis of energy and environment is such that the leaders must push energy cooperation. India sits at the nub of all potential opportunities and must take the lead.

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This chapter is a part of Brookings India’s briefing book, “Reinvigorating SAARC: India’s Opportunities and Challenges.”  To view the preface and table of contents, click here.

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Vikram Singh Mehta is the chairman of Brookings India in New Delhi and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was previously the chairman of the Shell Group of Companies. His research focuses on energy policy, particularly related to oil and gas.

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The post From Energy Crisis to Energy Sufficiency? first appeared on CSEP.

Yet, the potential for military cooperation is conceivable in three scenarios: first, under United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in non-SAARC countries; second, operations against non-state actors, particularly militant groups; and third, relief and rescue operations in the wake of natural disasters. In this context, SAARC as a regional body can play a collective and cooperative role.

Consider the following: SAARC currently contributes around 35 per cent of all UN peacekeeping troops – the single largest contribution made by any region. Thus, the formation of a body under SAARC to coordinate policies, troop contributions and joint training for UN peacekeeping is not out of the question. Similarly, SAARC currently has a counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing unit, and therefore, proposing such a unit for UN peacekeeping should not raise objections among member nations. Individually, SAARC countries have made impressive contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, with Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Nepal leading contributions of troops and police personnel. The benefits of such a cooperative body could include joint training exercises between member nations, as well as the sharing of expertise and intelligence for peacekeeping.

Having a joint body under SAARC for UN peacekeeping would also strengthen the region’s position on the global stage in the dust-up between Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the countries funding peacekeeping operations. This joint body might give a greater voice to SAARC troop contributing countries in decision-making related to UN peacekeeping operations – be it to determine operational and logistics issues, or to develop a UN mandate on peacekeeping, or to make key appointments to head peacekeeping operations. Currently, these decision making powers rest with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and other countries who are the main financial contributors to peacekeeping operations. Presently there is an imbalance between the developing nations which provide the most number of troops and the finance-contributing nations. Thus, a collaborative SAARC effort would go a long way in adding some weight in determining the UN peacekeeping agenda.

Along with UN peacekeeping, SAARC should also explore the possibility to develop special task forces to tackle challenges, such as piracy, posed by non-state actors. Currently, countries such as India and Pakistan have made individual efforts in dealing with the threat of piracy. However, a joint effort with other SAARC maritime nations would once again strengthen the region’s ability to deal with such issues at the operational and institutional level. Similarly, at the request of a SAARC member nation, assistance can be provided collectively to tackle internal security threats.

Defense and military cooperation could also play a role in cross-border natural disaster management and mitigation in affected SAARC countries. The bilateral offer by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to his Pakistani counterpart following the recent floods in Kashmir is indicative of the kind of cooperation possible between SAARC countries to tackle natural disasters.

The SAARC Disaster Management Center set up in 2006 was an important step in facilitating capacity building services as well as providing policy advice for SAARC nations in mitigating the impact of natural disasters. Training exercises for troops from SAARC nations on disaster management could be valuable in joint search and rescue missions, and relief efforts. The Kashmir earthquake in 2005, the 2006 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the 2014 Kashmir floods were instances where a joint military effort by SAARC nations would have aided relief operations.

A collaborative SAARC effort on defense and military cooperation can prove to be beneficial to SAARC member nations, as well as to the region as a whole. Strengthening SAARC on the global platform would increasingly benefit each individual country’s stance on key issues related to global threats and security.

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This chapter is a part of Brookings India’s briefing book, “Reinvigorating SAARC: India’s Opportunities and Challenges.”  To view the preface and table of contents, click here.

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W.P.S. Sidhu is senior fellow for foreign policy at Brookings India in New Delhi and the Brookings Institution. Sidhu’s research focuses on India’s role in the emerging global order; the role of the United Nations and regionalism; and confidence-building measures, disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation issues. 

Shruti Gakhar is research assistant at Brookings India, where she supports Senior Fellows with research in various policy areas including economics, foreign policy, urbanization and education.

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