Fencing, Security and Border Management: The Indian experience

In September 2024, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), gave in-principle approval for fencing and road construction along the 1,643 km long India-Myanmar border over the next ten years, at an estimated cost of Rs.31,000 crore. This decision comes in the backdrop of evolving security challenges arising from the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, including a surge in refugee inflows, and burgeoning illegal narcotics trade. This fencing project – third along India’s land borders – constitutes a key component of New Delhi’s evolving border management approach to regulate cross-border movement and mitigate emerging security threats through an infrastructure-led approach.

India’s vast land border has faced five wars and experienced other security threats such as illegal migration, cross-border human and narcotics trafficking, cattle smuggling, proliferation of fake currency notes, etc. Over the last three decades, the Indian state has sought to address this challenge through a calibrated mix of physical infrastructure, institutional mechanisms and development programs. Initiatives such as the setting up of  Department of Border Management (2004) in the Ministry of Home Affairs, expansion of the Border Area Development Programme (BADP, 1986-87), and the more recent Vibrant Villages Program (2023), reflect a growing policy consensus that securing borders requires not only fencing but increased state presence. Border Fencing is a part of the GoI’s  Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM) Scheme.

This blog examines the evolving state of implementation of border fencing with India’s neighbours – an issue that remains an understudied but crucial aspect of border management.

This blog examines the evolving state of implementation of border fencing with India’s neighbours – an issue that remains an understudied but crucial aspect of border management. Although border fencing defies uniform characterisation – ranging from barbed wire enclosures to concrete walls – it fundamentally refers to a physical infrastructure along an international boundary that restricts or regulates movement.

The blog also delves into the institutional architecture and political economy of border fencing, highlighting the decision-making structure at the center and state levels. It, however, does not assess the effectiveness of fencing as a border management tool. The focus is confined to India’s land borders and excludes the maritime domain, which is governed by a distinct maritime security framework.

Current Status: How Much of India’s Border Has been Fenced?

While the fencing project across the Myanmar border is in the initial stages, work on the other two border fences has been around for a long time and is at various stages of completion (Table 1).

Table I: Status of India’s Border Fencing

Source: author’s compilation using data from PIB, MHA Annual Report and media reports.

Note: % of unfenced border includes non-feasible stretches and disputed areas as well.

Notwithstanding some common border security threats that India faces along its various borders, each border also comes with its own set of challenges.

At the India-Bangladesh border, the primary concern has revolved around issues such as illegal immigration and cattle smuggling. The Border Security Force (BSF) estimates that about 20 lakh heads of cattle are smuggled out of India into Bangladesh annually. Fencing along this border was initiated in 1986, following the Assam Accords of 1985. Since then, 78.9% of the border has been fenced along stretches in Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya, and Tripura.

India’s border with Pakistan presents a different security calculus, rooted in issues such as cross-border terrorism and drug smuggling. Fencing at this international border (IB), particularly along the Punjab, Jammu and Rajasthan borders, preceded the Kargil War and has since been fortified further, standing at 61.4%. This border has also seen technological upgrades, such as night vision cameras, motion sensors, etc., as part of an integrated security and surveillance architecture. Since the launch of Operation Sindoor in May 2025, the MHA has also approved a ‘comprehensive upgrade’ of the India-Pakistan border, combining surveillance with anti-infiltration technology such as night-vision cameras and motion sensors.

In contrast, fencing along the India-Myanmar border remains minimal, with only 30 kms of the border fenced (less than 2%) including a significant 10 km stretch in Moreh (Manipur). The complex security situation, marked by the effective control of the border areas by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) like the Arakan Army, and sensitivities around illegal cross-border movements, has pushed New Delhi to expedite its fencing project. The Free Movement Regime was also scrapped in February 2024 citing such concerns. However, recognising the shared deep ethnic linkages across the border, New Delhi in December 2024, allowed a new arrangement for cross-border movement for people living within 10 km of the Myanmar-Manipur border that would be regulated from 43 designated border crossing points where Assam Rifles (AR) personnel will issue ‘border passes’ to regulate entry and exit.

The AR, tasked with guarding this border, face a unique set of  challenges emanating from difficult topography, including dense forests that make patrolling an uphill task and create a breeding ground for drug trafficking, insurgent movement, and narco-terrorism. These conditions have necessitated a more nuanced, multi-layered approach to border management in the Northeast.

Lastly, along India’s other land borders, fencing has not been undertaken along the border with China due to differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and related agreements. Likewise, the borders with Nepal and Bhutan remain unfenced, a reflection of long-standing treaty-based open-border regimes and relatively low levels of traditional border threats.

Institutional Framework: Who Fences the Border? 

Border fencing effort from India is a complex undertaking that involves multiple stakeholders, within the broader framework of border management. While the primary mandate lies with India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the implementation of fencing involves coordination across several ministries, state governments and ground-level agencies.

Border fencing effort from India is a complex undertaking that involves multiple stakeholders, within the broader framework of border management. While the primary mandate lies with India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the implementation of fencing involves coordination across several ministries, state governments and ground-level agencies.

The institutional foundation was strengthened following the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee report. Following this, in April 2000, GoI set up a Group of Ministers (GoM) on Border Management to review the national security system in its entirety. Based on the recommendations of the GoM, the Department of Border Management was formed in 2004. The department comprises two divisions – Border Management (BM) I and II. BM-1 manages infrastructure in the border areas including construction of fence, floodlighting, roads and BOPs. BM-II is tasked with the implementation of schemes like BADP, Vibrant Villages Scheme, coastal security schemes, etc. It also exercises oversight over the Land Port Authority of India (LPAI).

The administrative control of the Centrally Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) also lies with the MHA. The CAPFs include the BSF, AR, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) that guard India’s different borders under the overall principle of ‘one border one force.’

In addition to the MHA, several other stakeholders play an important role. The state governments (including the state police), other ministries (such as the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence), district administration and central/state agencies (Border Roads Organisation, Central Public Works Department, etc.) are key stakeholders that support the decision making, execution and maintenance of border fencing. The role of the state governments is critical, particularly due to land acquisition requirements, which is a major bottleneck in fencing projects.

At the grassroots level, the border communities also remain key, albeit often under-acknowledged, stakeholders. Their livelihood, mobility and security are directly shaped by fencing decisions.

Key Trends: How is India’s Border Fencing Strategy Evolving?

A review of the different border fencing initiatives across India’s land borders indicates four key trends.

1. Differentiated fencing priorities based on threat perception: New Delhi adopts a tailored approach to border fencing, determined by an assessment of the nature and intensity of threat perception, as well as strategic necessity, by the policymakers.

New Delhi adopts a tailored approach to border fencing, determined by an assessment of the nature and intensity of threat perception, as well as strategic necessity, by the policymakers.

For instance, the border with Nepal and Bhutan remains un-fenced due to treaty arrangements and minimal border security. The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) and the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty (2007) institutionalise open borders that reflect mutual trust and shared socio-cultural affinities. Conversely, borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, where cross-border threats such as terrorism, smuggling or insurgency are viewed as more acute, have seen significantly higher levels of border fencing.

However, threat prioritisation or perception is not static. India’s recalibration of the FMR with Myanmar in 2024, shows how the approach to border management is also responsive to geopolitical and security flux.

2. Centralised decision making structure: The border fencing decision making architecture in India is highly centralised, led by the MHA. While states and local administrations are operational partners, playing an important role in land acquisition and village rehabilitation, they remain subordinate to national security imperatives determined by the Centre. While top-down, in some ways this structure can also accommodate local, socio-economic concerns of the border communities and border areas. One case in point is the Punjab Police’s initiative on the deployment of advanced anti-drone technology in a bid to check cross-border drug and arms trafficking while working in tandem with the BSF, which guards the India-Pakistan border. While such attempts are occasionally made towards a bottom-up approach to border management in general and fencing in particular, the decision-making apparatus, nonetheless, remains predominantly top-down in nature.

3. Regional sensitivities and neighbourhood perceptions: India’s fencing efforts, particularly when undertaken unilaterally, are not always perceived as friendly gestures by neighbour country governments and other political actors. For instance, in May 2025, the National Unity Government (government in exile) of Myanmar has urged India to suspend border fencing as it is “unilateral” and undertaken in “areas where the boundary remains unresolved”. Bangladesh has also objected , arguing that India’s attempts at fencing violate bilateral agreements, including 1975 Joint India-Bangladesh guidelines that prohibit construction of any defensive structures within 150 yards of the international border. India, however, does not regard wired fences as a defense infrastructure. These diverging interpretations lead to frictions, both at diplomatic and operational levels. Such concerns have also been recognised in parliamentary responses, and pose a persistent challenge to India’s border management objectives.

4. Supporting conventional fencing with technology: India’s border security has also incorporated technological solutions, to support the conventional barbed wired and physical barriers infrastructure. Advanced surveillance systems, as exemplified by the increasing use of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), CCTVs, motion sensors, underground sensors, Hand-Held Thermal Imager (HHTI), Night Vision Device (NVD), Twin Telescope, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) act as a force multiplier to secure the borders. This is particularly important in terrains contained by topographical challenges, such as those along the India-Myanmar border.

This has also led to cross-learning among the CAPFs. For instance, the successful deployment of laser fences by the BSF along the India-Pakistan border inspired the SSB along the India-Nepal border to propose a similar venture in the Sonauli check post (UP) with a possibility of further extension. Institutional best practices are thus often replicated, which enables cross-fertilisation of ideas and better border management overall.

Enhancing multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder border management

Fencing is an integral component of border management and plays an important role in securing India’s borders. As physical barriers increasingly become a part of national boundaries globally, India’s fencing project carries not just security implications, but also diplomatic and socio-economic consequences, particularly for the border communities.

As a high-impact and sensitive intervention, border fencing must be analysed both horizontally (across institutions and sectors) and vertically (from national to local levels) to inform responsive and resilient policymaking.

Given the high stakes, border fencing demands a nuanced, evidence-based approach, grounded in multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder research. Furthermore, research on innovative practices, such as the BSF’s use of beehives on smart fences to offer the border communities an alternative source of income, needs to be encouraged for further replication. Strengthening research on smart fencing with a focus on technological gaps, can further enhance the operational capacity of India’s border guarding forces. Finally, these initiatives also require New Delhi to invest in diplomatic engagements with the neighbouring countries to overcome perception challenges.

As a high-impact and sensitive intervention, border fencing must be analysed both horizontally (across institutions and sectors) and vertically (from national to local levels) to inform responsive and resilient policymaking