
Economic Security in the Indo-Pacific: India-Japan Cooperation on Critical Minerals
Editor's Note
This post is part of a blog series on India’s International Partnerships on Critical Minerals. This blog series aims to develop of comprehensive series of posts that serve as authoritative primers and reference materials on India's recent activities and policies in the geopolitical landscape surrounding critical minerals. This series is authored by Anindita Sinh, Research Analyst at Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP). All content reflects the views of the author. The Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP) does not hold an institutional view on any subject.
The launch of India’s National Critical Minerals Mission (NCMM) in January 2025 and Japan’s 7th Strategic Energy Plan (SEP) in February 2025, places emphasis in each country, on securing supply chains for critical minerals. The initiatives indicate growing strategic convergence and the potential to elevate bilateral relations. This moment provides a timely opportunity to reimagine India–Japan cooperation as a key pillar of Indo-Pacific economic security, especially in a world increasingly shaped by resource diplomacy.
In November 2024, India and Japan convened their inaugural Economic Security Dialogue, emphasising a shared resolve to deepen strategic cooperation in the face of growing geopolitical volatility and technological competition. The statement recognised that “both sides underscored the need for closer collaboration to protect economic interests, and build resilient supply chains…by way of policy facilitation for business and academic partnership between relevant actors in India and Japan.”
Japan and India have been partnering in the rare earth elements (REEs) space as far back as 2012 but these recent developments signal a shared sense of urgency: both democracies recognise that reliable access to minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, rare earths and others is essential for clean-energy goals, industrial growth, and economic security.
This article explores the evolution of the India-Japan economic relationship, Japan’s domestic and international policies in the critical minerals sector, the evolution of India and Japan’s critical minerals cooperation, and the pathways for enhancing this partnership.
Geostrategic convergences underlining the India-Japan partnership
The India–Japan partnership is anchored in a broader partnership of shared values and economic ties. Both nations elevated their relationship to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership in 2014, built on democratic governance, rule of law, and civilisational links. Economically, their ties are institutionalised by landmark agreements. The 2011 India–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) is among India’s most comprehensive free-trade pacts, covering goods, services, and investment. This has liberalised over 94% of bilateral trade and spurred investment. India and Japan also coordinate through multiple joint forums. For example, the Industrial Competitiveness Partnership (launched in 2021) and the Clean Energy Partnership (CEP, launched in 2022) are agreements that foster joint ventures and financing in energy, steel, textiles, and advanced manufacturing. Japan pledged ~JPY 5 trillion (USD 42 billion) of public and private Japanese investment over five years for projects in India.
Concrete projects underline this industrial collaboration. Indian and Japanese firms are already working together on rare earths and clean energy. In the minerals sector, for example, Toyota Tsusho (a trading arm of Toyota Group) partnered with India’s Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) as far back as 2012, to separate and refine rare earths mined in India. This collaboration paved the way for Toyota Tsusho’s subsidiary, Toyotsu Rare Earths India, which processes thousands of tons of Indian rare earth oxides and purifies them for export back to Japan. Such ventures help Japan’s industries (automotive, electronics, defence) secure supply of magnet-grade rare metals, while giving India value-added industrial capacity. In clean energy, Japanese companies are also active partners. For instance, in 2022 DENSO Kirloskar Industries (a Japanese-Indian JV) installed solar-powered water-pumping systems in rural Karnataka to recharge aquifers and promote carbon-neutral water supply. This illustrates how Japanese expertise in green tech and manufacturing supports India’s sustainable infrastructure.
These ties are underpinned by shared multilateral interests. Both India and Japan are founding members of the Quad. They also coordinate in forums like the International Solar Alliance (ISA), the Mission Innovation, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) with partner countries. Under the Quad’s 2023 Summit, the leaders even launched the Quad Investors Network (QUIN) – a forum of major institutional investors and companies from each country – to co-invest in “critical technologies” and strengthen resilient supply chains.
India–Japan relations are deep and diverse: grounded in shared values and democracy, backed by agreements like CEPA, and exemplified by joint projects such as rare-earth refining with IREL amongst various other industrial and business level collaborations. This broad partnership provides a strong foundation for jointly tackling the challenges of critical mineral security.
Japan’s domestic ecosystem for energy security
Japan’s evolving strategy on critical minerals is deeply shaped by both past disruptions and forward-looking priorities. The 2010 incident with China, when rare earth exports were curtailed, served as a turning point, prompting Tokyo to strengthen the institutional role of the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) formerly called Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation. This allowed the agency to directly invest in overseas mining projects and secure access to vital inputs. Within a decade it slashed its reliance on Chinese rare earths from about 90% to roughly 58%. Japan invested in overseas mining projects, built strategic stockpiles, and supported new recycling and substitution technologies. For example, Japan’s Shin-Etsu Chemical has long operated world-class facilities for rare-earth separation, using advanced solvent-extraction methods since the 1960s. The momentum intensified after subsequent crises, notably the 2011 Fukushima disaster and, more recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—both of which exposed Japan’s vulnerability due to its high dependence on imported energy and minerals.
In response, Japan’s domestic policy has become more assertive and structured (see Table 2). The approval of the 7th Strategic Energy Plan (SEP) in February 2025 reflects a major shift in how Tokyo approaches critical mineral security. The plan identifies copper and battery materials as essential for the country’s green transition, setting the tone for new initiatives. Financial tools and public-private partnerships are being deployed to support Japanese companies in acquiring overseas mining assets, while domestic capabilities are being enhanced through mineral recycling and exploration of seabed resources, especially in areas near Japan’s coastline that have shown promising reserves.
At the same time, Japan is paying closer attention to the environmental implications of deep-sea mining, with sustainability principles increasingly guiding its domestic exploration strategy. Taken together, these developments signal a broader effort by Japan to build greater technological autonomy and supply chain resilience, while remaining open to strategic international partnerships to meet its long-term critical mineral needs.
…these developments signal a broader effort by Japan to build greater technological autonomy and supply chain resilience, while remaining open to strategic international partnerships to meet its long-term critical mineral needs.
Strategic Alignment: India–Japan cooperation for critical minerals
India and Japan share a large majority of critical minerals in their official lists, with over 20 minerals in common (see Table 3), reflecting strong alignment in their strategic focus areas for technology, energy, and security.
The history of India–Japan cooperation in resources and clean energy goes back decades and has accelerated in recent years. Their partnership has evolved from general development aid to strategic joint initiatives. For example, Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India originally focused on infrastructure (e.g. the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor and Mumbai–Ahmedabad bullet train), but has expanded to high-technology and green growth. Likewise, institutional mechanisms such as the India–Japan Energy Dialogue (est. 2006) and Steel Dialogue (est. 2020) integrate discussions of resource inputs and efficiency. Under the Clean Energy Partnership (CEP), Japan has extended over ¥300 billion (US$2.7 billion) loans for solar and wind projects. These ongoing frameworks mean that resource security is not a side issue, but a core part of planning: access to minerals like lithium for batteries or rare earths for wind turbines is built into energy and industrial planning.
These ongoing frameworks mean that resource security is not a side issue, but a core part of planning: access to minerals like lithium for batteries or rare earths for wind turbines is built into energy and industrial planning.
Within this context, rare-earth collaboration is a flagship example. The IREL–Toyota Tsusho joint venture demonstrates a long-term, sustained engagement. After the 2012 MoU and launch of Toyotsu Rare Earths India, both sides continue exploring further steps. But the cooperation can go beyond a single commodity. Japan’s can shared its newly developed deep-sea mining technology with India’s nascent efforts, dovetailing with India’s own Deep Ocean Mission. Meanwhile, India’s ambition to build gigafactories and expand EV production creates demand for Japanese battery technology and minerals. In both cases, joint labs and Research and Development (R&D) can be established. For example, partnerships between Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science & Technology and Indian Institutes for Technology or the various labs under the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, could be considered.
India–Japan mineral collaboration is already woven into a larger tapestry of industrial development and infrastructure investment.
Thus, India–Japan mineral collaboration is already woven into a larger tapestry of industrial development and infrastructure investment (see Table 1). Japanese investment and technology help build up India’s renewable energy capacity and semiconductor labs, both of which hinge on reliable mineral inputs. Conversely, India’s growing manufacturing base and resource potential allow Japan to mitigate supply risks. Together, they are turning the shared strategic vision of a diversified, resilient Indo-Pacific economy into concrete action – from tying supply chains in Quad initiatives to implementing the ambitious Clean Energy Partnership loans. All these efforts not only address energy transition goals, but also strengthen economic security: by ensuring neither country can be easily cut off from the minerals needed to sustain its industries and clean-tech future.
Table 1: India-Japan cooperation in the critical minerals sector
| Year | Policy | Key Highlights |
| 2024 | India-Japan Dialogue on Economic Security, Strategic Trade, and Technology | The inaugural round of this dialogue in November 2024 focused on building resilient supply chains, industrial and technological resilience, and collaboration in research and application of key technologies, including critical minerals. |
| 2023 | Japan-India Semiconductor Supply Chain MoC | India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) to strengthen collaboration in the semiconductor supply chain, recognising the critical role of minerals and materials in electronics and digital technologies. |
| 2022 | India-Japan Clean Energy Partnership | This partnership covers areas such as electric vehicles, battery storage, and recycling of materials from batteries and electronics, all of which rely on critical minerals. The partnership also supports joint research and public-private collaboration in clean energy and resource efficiency. |
| 2021 | QUAD Agreement on Rare Earths | Japan, India, the US, and Australia (QUAD) signed an agreement for cooperation in procuring rare earths, reinforcing multilateral supply chain resilience and Indo-Japanese collaboration in critical minerals. |
| 2021 | Virtual Meeting on Rare Earths | A virtual meeting between India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) included discussions on rare earth minerals, highlighting ongoing collaboration in this area. |
| 2018 | India-Japan Digital Partnership (IJDP) | While not exclusively about critical minerals, this partnership launched new initiatives in science, technology, and ICT, and set the stage for deeper collaboration in supply chains for advanced technologies. |
| 2015 | Joint Statement post Summit Meeting | During the 2015 India-Japan Energy Dialogue, both countries acknowledged the Sale Purchase Agreement between IREL and Toyotsu Rare Earths India Pvt. Ltd., a subsidiary of Toyota Tsusho Corporation, for the supply of mixed rare earth chloride. They agreed to continue discussions to enhance cooperation in the rare earth sector and expedite the commencement of commercial production. |
| 2014 | Commercial Contract: IREL-Toyota Tsusho | Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) and Toyota Tsusho Corporation (TTC) signed a commercial contract for exploration and production of rare earths, aiming to supply raw material to a Japanese rare earth production unit in Vizag. The deal was part of efforts to reduce Japan’s dependence on China for REEs. |
| 2012 | MoU on Rare Earths Cooperation | India (Department of Atomic Energy) and Japan (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) signed an MoU to cooperate in the field of rare earth minerals. This laid the foundation for joint technology and supply chain efforts. |
| 2010 | Joint Statement: Vision for India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade | Noted the importance of REEs and decided to pursue bilateral cooperation in the development, recycling and re-use of rare earths and rare metals, as well as further research into their industrial substitutes. |
| 2007 | India-Japan Energy Dialogue | Under the larger umbrella of Strategic and Global Partnership, the two acknowledged the importance of ensuring stable energy supply essential for both economies and discussed the issues of energy security and environmental protection. |
Source: Authors compilation based on various sources. Not exhaustive.
Strengthening Ties
India emerged at the most promising destination for Japanese business investments according to a 2024 survey by the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) surpassing China and Southeast Asia. This potential of expanding investment in India could also find resonance within the emerging critical minerals sector. To realise the full potential of India-Japan cooperation on critical minerals, targeted and strategic interventions are essential. The following policy options outline key areas where bilateral collaboration can deliver long-term economic and strategic gains.
- Leverage the QUIN: India and Japan could channel QUIN’s funding into joint ventures for mineral processing in India, such as lithium or rare earth refineries. Harmonised export-credit and insurance support from Quad countries can enable long-term Japanese investment, framing these projects as strategic Quad-tech infrastructure.
- Pursue triangular cooperation in Africa: New Delhi and Tokyo may consider joint investments in mining and logistics infrastructure in Africa and Southeast Asia. Through mechanisms like the India-Japan Cooperation Initiative for Sustainable Economic Development in Africa, they can co-finance extraction and transport, pool technical expertise, and offer coordinated bids to reduce Chinese dominance in resource-rich regions.
- Promote a circular economy for minerals: India and Japan can assess opportunities to co-develop recycling technologies and urban mining capacities. Indo-Japanese R&D hubs and recovery plants for EV batteries or e-waste in India would strengthen domestic supply loops, reduce imports, and enhance sustainability.
- Collaborate on green extraction and processing technology: The two countries can consider launching a joint Clean Metals Research Hub to develop eco-friendly mining and processing methods. This could include robotic mining, zero-waste processing, or safe handling of radioactive materials, drawing on Japan’s tech expertise and India’s operational scale. It could be jointly funded by Japan’s Science and Technology Agency and India’s Department of Science and Technology, with industry partners co-financing.
- Invest in industry capacity-building and human capital: To ensure project success, Japan can consider investing in Indian training programs in mining and materials engineering, including expanding Japan-India Institutes for Manufacturing (JIMs) and technical exchanges. Building a skilled workforce and aligning operational standards will ensure long-term strategic compatibility for critical mineral partnerships.
By taking these steps, India and Japan would not only bolster their own economic security but also set an example of partnership. Joint processing hubs, co-financed mines abroad, circular-economy networks and collaborative labs would create redundancies and resilience in supply chains. Each suggestion is a concrete building block: they enable shared investments and technology exchange, reduce reliance on any one supplier (particularly China), and smooth the path of commodities from mine to factory. In an era where critical minerals power clean energy and digital industries, an India–Japan alliance makes strategic sense and reflects shared democratic values. Together, they can translate their growing Special Strategic and Global Partnership into tangible supply-chain security – strengthening both economies while supporting global efforts for a diversified, sustainable future.
Annex
Table 2: Japan’s international partnerships and policy initiatives on critical minerals
| Year | Policy | Highlights |
| 2025 | Japan – Republic of Korea | First Japan-Korea High Level Dialogue on critical minerals. The two sides exchanged views on sharing policies for critical minerals between Japan and the ROK, cooperation in stockpiling of mineral resources, and joint production and off-take in third countries, as efforts to strengthen bilateral ties in the supply chain for critical minerals |
| 2024 | Japan-India | Inaugural Economic Security Dialogue, including Strategic Trade and Technology where the two partners discussed issues of economic security – building resilient supply chains and critical infrastructure underscoring the importance of critical minerals. |
| 2024 | Japan – Democratic Republic of Congo | Japan’s Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Gécamines, the DRC’s state-owned mining company, to develop the Lobito Corridor, focusing on copper cathode and cobalt hydroxide production. This collaboration aims to diversify and stabilize Japan’s supply of critical minerals. |
| 2024 | Japan – Brazil | Japan- Brazil Agreement (Nickel-Cobalt) The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed an MoU with Vale S.A., a leading Brazilian mining company, to strengthen cooperation in the supply chain resilience of mineral resources, including nickel and cobalt. This agreement supports Japan’s efforts to secure stable supplies of raw materials for low-carbon steel production and other decarbonisation initiatives. |
| 2024 | Japan – Australia’s Northen Territory | MoU signed by Minister for Mining Mark Monaghan and Mr Hiroshi KUBOTA, Executive Vice President of Metals Unit (JOGMEC), focuses on greater collaboration with critical mineral supply chains. Will be facilitated through the exploration, extraction, processing and supply of critical minerals such as nickel, cobalt, lithium, graphite and rare earth elements. |
| 2023 | Japan – Indonesia | Japan–Indonesia Agreement (Nickel Focus) As Indonesia is the world’s largest nickel producer; Japan seeks to reduce over-reliance on China by securing stable nickel supply for EV batteries and green technologies. |
| 2024 | Japan – UK | A partnership between the UK and Japan to support collaboration on resilient, transparent, and sustainable critical mineral supply chains. |
| 2023 | Japan – US | Agreement to strengthen and diversify critical minerals supply chains and promote the adoption of electric vehicle battery technologies. To facilitate trade, promote fair competition and market-oriented conditions for trade in critical minerals, ensure robust labour and environmental standards, and cooperate in efforts to ensure secure, sustainable, and equitable critical minerals supply chains. |
| 2023 | Japan – Chile | JBIC entered into an MoU with Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO) to strengthen cooperation in critical minerals and decarbonisation sectors. This partnership supports Chile’s National Lithium Strategy, with CODELCO playing a leading role in its implementation; Japan and Chile signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) focusing on the energy transition, including collaboration on hydrogen, ammonia, and critical minerals. This agreement aimed to enhance bilateral cooperation in energy and mineral resource development. |
| 2023 | Japan – EU | The European Commission and Japan’s Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) signed an Administrative Arrangement on Cooperation in Critical Raw Materials Supply Chains. This agreement focuses on strengthening collaboration on critical mineral standards, traceability, and supply chain resilience. |
| 2023 | Japan – African Countries | JOGMEC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with African countries in Republic of Zambia, and Scope of Work (SW) in Republic of Namibia and Democratic Republic of Congo in order to secure critical minerals. |
| 2021 | Strategic Energy Plan (6th Plan)
| This plan prioritised securing critical minerals like lithium and nickel to support its green transformation. |
| 2021 | Japan – Quad | Japan and India, along with other members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), signed an agreement to cooperate on procuring rare earths. This collaboration aims to bolster both countries’ critical raw materials (CRM) supply security. |
| 2021 | Japan – ASEAN countries | Under the ASEAN Minerals Cooperation Action Plan Phase III (AMCAP-III), Japan and ASEAN countries have been working together to promote sustainable mineral development. This includes initiatives to develop critical mineral value chains and increase mineral cooperation within ASEAN and with global partners. |
| 2021 | 5-Year Action Plan (2021–2025) | This plan focused on rare mineral stockpiling and recycling, aiming to enhance resource security. It strengthened collaborations with ASEAN countries, India, and the European Union to secure critical minerals essential for advanced technologies and clean energy. These partnerships include joint research initiatives, resource recycling programs, strategic stockpiling, and the development of sustainable, transparent supply chains to enhance resilience and reduce dependency on single suppliers. |
| 2019 | Japan – Canada | The focus of the MoU with British Columbia shifted more toward the development of clean energy and critical minerals. |
| 2018 | Inclusion of Rare Earths in Strategic Energy Plan | The aim was to enhance energy security and support electrified vehicles and renewable energy technologies. |
| 2017 | Japan – US | The Japan–U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership (JUSEP) fostered collaboration on clean energy and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region, emphasising sustainable development and energy security |
| 2017 | Tax Incentives for Battery & Green Tech Component Producers | It strengthened collaboration with Australia through JOGMEC-Lynas partnerships to enhance rare earth supply chain resilience and reduce overdependence on China. |
| 2015 | Critical Mineral Substitution and Processing Tech (R&D) | It focused on R&D to develop alternative materials and advanced processing methods, aiming to reduce reliance on imported rare earths and strengthen industrial resilience. |
| 2014 | Japan – Chile | A Letter of Intent (LOI) with CODELCO, Chile’s state-owned copper company, to strengthen strategic partnerships in mineral resource exploration and the application of Japanese advanced technology; MoU with COCHILCO, the Chilean Copper Commission, to enhance cooperation in metals and mining, focusing on information exchange regarding market trends, investment climates, and technological developments. |
| 2013 | Policy for Seabed Mining Development through JOGMEC | This policy explored deep-sea rare earth and metal deposits within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone, enhancing resource self-sufficiency and reducing import reliance. |
| 2012 | Japan – Vietnam | A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Vietnam’s Lai Chau-VIMICO Rare Earth Joint Stock Company and Japan’s Dong Pao Rare Earth Development Co. This MoU focused on the mining and processing of rare earth elements in the Dong Pao mine, located in Tam Duong district, Lai Chau province. |
| 2011 | Recycling Law for Small Home Appliances | It mandated proper collection and recycling of devices like mobile phones and digital cameras to recover rare metals and reduce environmental impact. |
| 2010 | Japan – Vietnam | During a summit in Hanoi, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung agreed on a strategic partnership for rare earth exploration, mining, and processing in Vietnam. This decision was part of Japan’s initiative to diversify its rare earth sources following China’s export restrictions. |
| 2010 | METI’s Rare Earth Action Plan | It aimed to reduce dependence on Chinese rare earths through supply diversification, and recycling |
| 2010 | Japan – Canada | JOGMEC entered into memorandum of agreement for Rare Earth Elements |
| 2010 | Japan – Australia | JOGMEC invested in Lynas Corporation’s Mount Weld rare earth project, securing a stable supply of REEs for Japan. This strategic partnership aimed to reduce Japan’s dependence on Chinese rare earth imports. |
| 2009 | Urban Mining Programs Launched | It was established to recycle rare metals from electronic waste, reducing import dependence and boosting supply chain resilience amid growing global demand for critical minerals. |
| 2004 | JOGMEC formed by merging JOMEC and Japan National Oil Corporation | It launched resource diplomacy via MoUs and strategic agreements to diversify supply chains and reduce China-dependence in critical minerals and rare earths. |
| 1983 | National Rare Metals Stockpiling Project | It was established as a cooperative system between the government and private sector, to ensure natural resource security and economic security. |
| 1981 | Japan Oil and Metals National Corporation (JOMEC) established | It was established to secure stable supplies of oil and non-ferrous metals through overseas exploration, financing and technical support. |
| 1967 | Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC) | Ensure a stable, inexpensive supply of oil, to provide necessary funding and liability guarantees for overseas oil exploration.
|
Source: Authors compilation based on various sources. Not exhaustive.
Table 3: Critical Minerals on India and Japan’s lists (Updated as of June 2025)
| Mineral | Indian List | Japanese List |
| Antimony | ✅ | ✅ |
| Beryllium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Bismuth | ✅ | ✅ |
| Cadmium | ✅ | ❌ |
| Cobalt | ✅ | ✅ |
| Copper | ✅ | ✅ |
| Gallium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Germanium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Graphite | ✅ | ✅ |
| Hafnium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Indium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Lithium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Molybdenum | ✅ | ✅ |
| Nickel | ✅ | ✅ |
| Niobium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Phosphorous | ✅ | ✅ |
| Platinum Group Elements (PGE) | ✅ | ✅ |
| Potash | ✅ | ❌ |
| Rare Earth Elements (REE) | ✅ | ✅ |
| Rhenium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Selenium | ✅ | ❌ |
| Silicon | ✅ | ✅ |
| Strontium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Tantalum | ✅ | ✅ |
| Tellurium | ✅ | ❌ |
| Tin | ✅ | ✅ |
| Titanium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Tungsten | ✅ | ✅ |
| Uranium | ❌ | ✅ |
| Vanadium | ✅ | ✅ |
| Zirconium | ✅ | ✅ |
Source: Author’s compilation based on various sources.
Note: The author would like to thank Tejal Karad, Research Intern, CSEP for her research assistance and Dr. Constantino Xavier, Senior Fellow, CSEP for his feedback..
Anindita Sinh
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