Defence Diplomacy in India’s Neighbourhood: Mapping Ministerial Visits Since 2014

While India invests in a more global defence diplomacy, the number of Defence Ministers’ visits to neighbouring countries remains limited.

Since 2014, India’s neighbourhood has witnessed a renewed push for engagement under New Delhi’s Neighbourhood First policy. As a result, there has been enhanced cooperation across various domains, ranging from infrastructure and connectivity to trade and defence. One indicator of the growing ties has been an increase in the frequency of high-level political engagements. For instance, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the first leader in nearly two decades to visit Nepal and Sri Lanka in 2014 and 2015 respectively. This is significant as high-level ministerial visits often act as a tool to strengthen diplomatic ties and expedite agreements. Bilateral interactions between high level officials allow both countries to address issues faster compared to the standard bureaucratic processes, and can help pave the way for agreements between countries on a range of matters. For example, during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Nepal in 2014, eight Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed between both sides across a diverse set of areas ranging from travel and connectivity to power and healthcare. Furthermore, a Line of Credit (LoC) worth US$ 1Billion was extended to the Government of Nepal and One Dhurv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Mark III was handed over to the Nepal Army.

While India’s neighbourhood policy focuses on enhancing cooperation across various domains, this article focuses on India’s defence diplomacy with its neighbours. In particular, it maps the bilateral visits undertaken by Indian Defence Ministers between 2014 and 2024 to India’s immediate neighbourhood—Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—based on open-source data collated from India’s Press Information Bureau (PIB) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) Annual Reports. This blog uses the term, “bilateral visits” to refer to official visits made by the Defence Minister to a country outside the context of multilateral forums or regional summits; that is, visits undertaken specifically for bilateral engagement rather than as part of broader multilateral gatherings such as the ASEAN Defence Minsters Meeting or the Shanghai Corporation Organisation Defence Ministers Meet.

Additionally, while high-level bilateral visits are an important aspect of defence diplomacy, they do not capture all aspects of India’s defence ties with its neighbours. Therefore, the blog does not aim to use the number of bilateral visits as a proxy to capture the overall health of India’s defence ties with its neighbours. Instead, the article limits its scope to a preliminary survey to understand the balance between regional and global visits by Indian Defence Ministers. It discusses trends in bilateral visits by the Defence Ministers, explores the potential motivations behind these visits, and examines their broader implications for India’s regional interests.

Overseas visits by India’s Defence Ministers

Between 2014 and 2024, India’s defence ministers have undertaken 39 visits across 23 countries. Notably, the United States has been the most frequent destination, with six visits, followed by four to Russia and Japan and three each to France, and Singapore.

Map 1: Countries visited by Indian Defence Ministers Since 2014

Source: Made by author using MapChart.net using data collected from PIB and MoD annual reports

Out of the 39 [Defence Minister] visits that have taken place abroad since 2014, India’s neighbourhood has received only three of them

Out of the 39 visits that have taken place abroad since 2014, India’s neighbourhood has received only three of them. In April 2016, then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar paid a two day visit to China followed by a visit to Bangladesh in November later that year. In May 2023, Rajnath Singh undertook a three-day visit to the Maldives. A fourth visit to Sri Lanka was scheduled to take place in November 2023. However, it was cancelled, reportedly due to the domestic political situation in Sri Lanka at that time and Indian concerns over a Chinese ‘research vessel’ being granted permission to dock in Sri Lanka

These high-level bilateral defence engagements and visits have typically focused on enhancing defence cooperation by promoting joint military exercises, capacity-building initiatives and training and exchange programmes.

Table 1: Defence Ministerial Visits to India’s Neighbourhood since 2014.

Source: author’s compilation using data from PIB and MoD annual reports

Parrikar’s 2016 visit to Bangladesh – the first by an Indian defence minister since diplomatic ties were established in 1971 – came amid China’s increasing defence cooperation with Dhaka. Earlier that month, Bangladesh had accepted the delivery of two refurbished Chinese Type 035G Ming-class diesel-electric submarines. Furthermore, in October 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping had visited Dhaka, during which Bangladesh-China relations were elevated to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” Parrikar’s timely visit signalled India’s intent to recalibrate its defence engagement with Bangladesh.

New Delhi’s decision to send Parrikar to Bangladesh in 2016 also signalled a shift in India’s regional defence strategy. Unlike the earlier engagements with a traditional focus on military training, joint exercises, and exchanges, this visit was notable for its emphasis on the defence industry and exports.

New Delhi’s decision to send Parrikar to Bangladesh in 2016 also signalled a shift in India’s regional defence strategy. Unlike the earlier engagements with a traditional focus on military training, joint exercises, and exchanges, this visit was notable for its emphasis on the defence industry and exports. A key outcome of the visit was the decision to work towards institutionalising defence engagement between both countries and enhancing collaboration in the defence industry.

The momentum carried into 2017, when Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited India. During this visit, New Delhi extended its first-ever defence Line of Credit (LoC) to Bangladesh, valued at $500 million, for the procurement of defence equipment from India. Additionally, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the framework for defence cooperation. The LoC and a new MoU reflected India’s evolving approach to regional defence diplomacy – anchored in industrial partnerships, strategic financing, and long-term collaboration.

Similarly, Rajnath Singh’s visit to the Maldives in May 2023 was pivotal in expanding the scope of India’s military and strategic engagement with Malé. During the visit, Rajnath Singh alongside his Maldivian counterpart, Mariya Didi, laid the foundation stone for the construction of  ‘Ekatha Harbour.’ The development of this naval facility at Sifavaru in Uthuru Thila Falhu (UTF) atoll is one of the biggest grant-in-aid projects of India. It is meant to be a repair facility for the Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF) Coast Guard vessels. As per the agreement, the harbour would be developed over a period of 15 years during which India will provide professional, technical and logistical support to manage the harbour. Apart from this, Rajnath Singh also handed over a Landing Craft to the MNDF and both sides agreed to ramp up defence trade, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between the armed forces of both countries.

Limited visits to the neighbourhood

While India’s Defence Ministers have made relatively few visits to the neighbourhood, a closer look reveals two important paradoxes at play.

First, India’s neighbourhood is a politically sensitive region. As the largest country in the region in terms of area, population, economy, and military strength, India often struggles to shed the perception of being a ‘big brother.’ This dynamic has often contributed to growing anti-India sentiments in the region, as seen in Bangladesh (2024) and the Maldives (2023). In such contexts, high-level bilateral visits can attract intense public scrutiny and be politicised by local media and political actors. For instance, Rajnath Singh’s visit to the Maldives in 2023 was met with strong criticism from the opposition despite the emphasis on grant projects and people to people cooperation, which mounted an “India Out” campaign. They portrayed the development of the Ekatha Harbour – supported by India – as a veiled attempt to expand Indian military presence on the island, framing it as a threat to Maldivian sovereignty. The situation escalated when President Mohamed Muizzu formally requested the withdrawal of all Indian military personnel from the Maldives on 18 November 2023. In light of such sensitivities, India may have opted to limit Defence Minister-level visits to avoid fuelling controversy or provoking domestic backlash in host countries.

The infrequency of such visits does not imply an absence of defence engagement. In fact, India has maintained robust engagement [with its neighbourhood] through its military leadership.

However, the infrequency of such visits does not imply an absence of defence engagement. In fact, India has maintained robust engagement through its military leadership. Service chiefs often visit the region, suggesting a preference for low-profile, steady military-to-military ties rather than headline-grabbing ministerial diplomacy. In 2024 itself, the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) undertook a four day visit to Bangladesh and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) undertook a five day visit to Nepal, and in May 2023 the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) undertook a four day visit to Sri Lanka. These visits broadly focused on enhancing military to military ties and featured addresses by the Indian service Chief’s at the host nations military institutions including the Staff College and the National Defence College. This approach of managing relations through frequent visits by the service Chiefs allows India to sustain defence cooperation while sidestepping political sensitivities.

Second, in some cases, the limited number of visits could also reflect the stability and maturity of India’s existing defence relationships in the region. Historically, India has shared strong defence ties with many of its neighbours. For instance, the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007 allows Bhutan to import arms, ammunition, and other defence equipment through India. Additionally, the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), operational in Bhutan since 1961-62, trains personnel of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Royal Bodyguard of Bhutan (RBG).

Such arrangements extend beyond Bhutan. India and Nepal maintain a longstanding tradition of awarding honorary General ranks to each other’s Army Chiefs. Similarly, India and Sri Lanka conduct annual joint military exercises under the “Mitra Shakti” framework, established in 2004. These examples highlight a broader trend – defence cooperation between India and its neighbours has remained consistent – largely through training programs, joint exercises, and officer exchanges. These ties are sustained through institutional links, largely managed at the service chiefs’ level. Historically, this has worked well and made frequent political engagement at the ministerial level less necessary.

India’s growing emphasis globally on defence manufacturing and exports, particularly since 2014, may push towards a more visible, political-level engagement with the neighbourhood.

Yet this model of quiet diplomacy may no longer be sufficient. India’s growing emphasis globally on defence manufacturing and exports, particularly since 2014, may push towards a more visible, political-level engagement with the neighbourhood. A key trend to watch will be whether India’s expanding defence production translates into more frequent ministerial visits and deeper bilateral outreach in the region. At the same time, the region’s sensitivities raise valid concerns: high-profile visits can be politically contentious, as seen in the case of the Maldives. Thus, two competing hypotheses emerge. One is that greater ministerial outreach will become necessary to support India’s evolving defence ambitions. The other is that such visits may remain rare, or even decline further due to increasing political risks and sensitivities. Both possibilities merit attention. How New Delhi manages to balance these imperatives amidst the changing regional landscape remains to be seen.