China’s Disaster Diplomacy in Myanmar

China’s extensive disaster relief efforts in Myanmar have important implications for India.

Two earthquakes of magnitudes 7.9 and 6.4 struck Myanmar on the afternoon of March 28, causing immense loss of life and property in regions of Sagaing, Mandalay, and Shan state. The effects of the disaster, which has now been labelled ‘the Big Mandalay Earthquake’ caused wreckage in the neighbouring Yunnan province of China and in Thailand.

India swiftly responded with emergency assistance to Myanmar under “Operation Brahma,” highlighting its role as the first responder in the region. Further, unlike in the past, India showed willingness and ability to collaborate with external partners to provide humanitarian assistance in its neighbourhood, in this case, the QUAD and ASEAN. It can be seen from the joint statement issued by the governments of India, US, Australia and Japan, that Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) is a key component in achieving shared goals of regional stability and security in the Indo-Pacific.

China has also emerged as a major provider of HADR in South Asia in the recent decades, for instance in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. In Myanmar, China was one of first countries to respond in the search and rescue operations which involved teams from 20 countries. Given the geo-political salience of disaster relief operations in the region, this blog examines the relief efforts carried out by China in Myanmar, outlining the activities and institutional channels involved, and the messaging in media. Effective implementation of Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief by China is not only a display of state capacity and soft power but also shows China’s growing influence in the region.

Effective implementation of Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief by China is not only a display of state capacity and soft power but also shows China’s growing influence in the region.

China’s Disaster Diplomacy

Disaster diplomacy refers to the strategic use of diplomatic efforts to address disasters, including natural calamities, pandemics, and environmental crises; and involves international cooperation to address humanitarian needs and rebuild communities. However, international aid and assistance in response to disasters is not a given. Research shows that there must pre-existing interest amongst those in power, before they are convinced to use their power to achieve disaster diplomacy goals.  China has both economic and strategic interests in Myanmar. It blocked a UNSC statement condemning the military coup in 2021 and since then has formally recognised the military regime, even providing financial and political backing. Following Operation 1027 and the joint resistance movement against the Junta launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, China had attempted to mediate and put an end to violence, particularly in the Rakhine state, where it has multibillion-dollar investments in infrastructure projects, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s rising influence in Myanmar is thus based on various channels, of which disaster aid is one component.

…there must pre-existing interest amongst those in power, before they are convinced to use their power to achieve disaster diplomacy goals.

China’s response included search and rescue teams, eight batches of emergency and humanitarian supplies including medical kits, food, tents, foldable beds, mosquito nets, and disease prevention materials, as well as more than 1 Billion RMB in emergency humanitarian aid. A Chinese university developed a ‘DeepSeek-driven’ Chinese-Myanmar-English translation system, while a global network of volunteers collected distress signals and mapped the disaster updates to help rescue teams. There are also plans to assist Myanmar in post disaster reconstruction and preservation and repair of damaged cultural relics and buildings.

Institutional Channels

About 28 civilian and governmental rescue teams and a wide range of institutions were involved in the rescue efforts.

Central and Provincial Governments:  While coordinated by the central government, the initial emergency response was implemented by the provincial government and party committee in Yunnan, the province bordering Myanmar. There were four official rescue teams, including Yunnan Rescue Team, Ministry of Emergency Management’s China Search and Rescue team, China International Search and Rescue team, and  Hong Kong SAR’s rescue team.  The Chinese PLA and PLAF also provided personnel and transport services. Special cross border clearance mechanism was also put into place for swift clearance. The Chinese rescue forces worked with both local forces and the rescue team from Russia. Financial aid was dispensed by the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), also known as China Aid. CIDCA is affiliated with the State Council and works under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.

Foundations, Business Enterprises, and Civilian Volunteers: More than 15 civilian volunteer teams came from areas like Hunan, Zhejiang, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. Social organisations and businesses were also mobilised as an institutional channel for providing aid and relief work. These included the Red Cross Society of China which donated 1.5 million RMB to Myanmar Red Cross Society via the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar. Some agencies also provided relief supplies directly to people. For instance, the China Foundation for Rural Development’s Myanmar office[1] distributed relief packages to households in Mandalay. Chinese state-owned enterprises in Myanmar like CITIC (which is involved in the implementation of the planned Kyaukphu Special Economic Zone and deep-sea port under the Belt and Road Initiative), and business associations like the Myanmar Chinese Chamber of Commerce and General Association of Dian Entrepreneurs also provided support in logistics and translation services.

Messaging in media

The Chinese Embassy in Myanmar proactively provided updates about the rescue efforts on the Embassy website and via social media. The messaging shows two important trends – one, to highlight China’s as the first international response in the aftermath of the crisis; and two, to weave this narrative into the larger Chinese narratives of neighbourhood diplomacy, community with a shared future, etc.

The messaging shows two important trends – one, to highlight China’s as the first international response in the aftermath of the crisis; and two, to weave this narrative into the larger Chinese narratives of neighbourhood diplomacy, community with a shared future, etc.

In the reporting about the rescue efforts, there is focus on the swiftness, effectiveness, and scale of the relief efforts. The embassy website has multiple updates on rescue and relief activities, often with time stamps; example, every day between 29^th March to 11^th April, the sixth batch of emergency aid was delivered. Rescue of survivors with the use of state of the art technology and machinery was also reported in detail on Chinese news channels and the embassy news. Several reports emphasise that “China was the first to provide aid, to send rescue teams, and to pull survivors from the rubble.” Notably, in its press release on ‘Operation Brahma’, India has also asserted its role as the “first responder in the region” and reported its rescue team as the “first international assistance flights to Naypyitaw.”

China’s disaster relief activities have been framed as a remarkable display of age-old ‘Pauk-Phaw’ friendship between China and Myanmar. There are multiple references to building the “China-Myanmar community with a shared future” and neighbourhood diplomacy guided by principles of “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness.” The use of these terms while delivering aid and assistance have the effect of giving a concrete and positive reference to these concepts. They are also aimed at strengthening China’s image as a provider of public goods in the region.

Furthermore, Chinese embassy news highlighted the appreciation from Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing for the rescue efforts. The presence of regional leaders like Yangon Chief Minister U Soe Thein to receive emergency supplies also added to the spectacle of receptivity for Chinese aid and assistance. This is crucial as in the past, Myanmar junta has refused international aid and even banned news items of relief efforts by domestic and international actors. Presently, there have been reports of Myanmar’s military blocking aid to earthquake survivors, and firing warning shots at the Chinese Red Cross envoy delivering aid in a conflict zone. Displaying support from the people and political authorities is hence an indication of the success of China’s soft power in Myanmar.

What this means for India

China’s response to the March 28 earthquakes in Myanmar reflects a strategic use of humanitarian aid as a tool of regional diplomacy. Beyond the immediate humanitarian imperative, the scale, speed, and publicity of the relief efforts underscore Beijing’s interest in deepening its influence in Myanmar through a multifaceted approach that includes infrastructural investments, political engagement, and now disaster diplomacy. The coordination between central and provincial institutions, the mobilization of civilian and commercial actors, and the deliberate media messaging collectively signal a comprehensive effort to integrate humanitarian relief into China’s broader foreign policy goals. By framing its aid within narratives of “Pauk-Phaw” friendship and a “shared future”, China not only reinforces its presence in Myanmar but also seeks to project itself as a responsible regional leader and a provider of public goods.

The coordination between central and provincial institutions, the mobilization of civilian and commercial actors, and the deliberate media messaging collectively signal a comprehensive effort to integrate humanitarian relief into China’s broader foreign policy goals.

China’s growing influence has implications for India and its ambitions as a regional leader. In the past, HADR has been a tool for strengthening India’s ties with Myanmar. Through ‘Operation Brahma’, which is guided by the policies of Neighbourhood First, Act East and SAGAR, India has sought to efficiently provide material aid and relief. Improving co-ordination with state governments, civil society, and media could help extend the scale and reach of operations. Further, while collaboration with Quad partners denotes greater Indian comfort in letting the Quad come closer into its immediate neighbourhood, India could take charge in reviving regional cooperation through forums like BIMSTEC. Developing a doctrine of proactive humanitarian support, with a regional cooperation aspect, would help India deliver better and faster.

Note: The author would like to thank Dr. Constantino Xavier, Senior Fellow, CSEP and Dr. Jabin Jacob, Non-Resident Fellow, CSEP, for their feedback.